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1 Introduction
“Incentives are the essence of economics.” (Prendergast, 1999, p. 7)
While this assumption nowadays is widely accepted, economics have ignored incen-
tives and internal arrangements within organizations for a long time. Economists only
interests lie in the market, supply and demand, prices and outcomes. A firm itself was
treated as a black box. It was not until Ronald Coase’s article “The Nature of the Firm”
(1937) that economists have recognized that institutions1 and the inside of a firm also
are of economic importance. A new perspective, the new institutional economics (NIE)2,
has broadened the scope of economics on institutions since then. It focuses on manifold
aspects that are excluded from neoclassical economics, e.g. transaction costs, property
rights, and incentives. In contrast to neoclassical economics, NIE assumes that individu-
als have “incomplete information and limited mental capacity and because of this they
face uncertainty about unforeseen events and outcomes and incur transaction costs to
acquire information. To reduce risk and transaction costs humans create institutions”
(Me´nard and Shirley, 2008, p. 1). The absence of perfect information is the starting
point for the importance of incentives.
Incentives are essential in order to solve the “principal-agent problem”. Principal-
Agent (PAT) or Agency Theory is part of NIE and discusses potential conflicts that
exist in the relationship between two economic actors: principal and agent. The division
of labor implies the necessity for delegation: Principals delegate authority to agents to
act on their behalf. “Whenever one individual depends on the action of another, an
1“Institutions are the written and unwritten rules, norms and constraints that humans devise to reduce
uncertainty and control their environment” (Me´nard and Shirley, 2008, p. 1).
2“The new institutional economics [...] is an interdisciplinary enterprise combining economics, law,
organization theory, political science, sociology and anthropology to understand the institutions of
social, political and commercial life” (Klein, 2000, p. 456).
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agency relationship arises. The individual taking the action is called the agent. The
affected party is the principal” (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985, p. 2). The central problem
in this agency relationship is that agents might not serve the principal’s interests. This
problem is mostly due to two factors: incomplete or asymmetric information and con-
flicting objectives. Principal’s and agent’s interests typically are not consistent with one
another.3 In a world without private information such conflicting objectives would not
cause incentive problems as a principal could induce agents to operate in the firm’s inte-
rest by offering “a contract which perfectly controls the agent” (Laffont and Martimort,
2002, p. 2). However, NIE starts out from imperfect information, i.e. the principal is
not able to monitor or evaluate agent’s action perfectly. In this case agents have options
open to pursue private goals. As both principal and agent seek to maximize their own
utility, agents will exploit their informational advantage at the expense of the principal
(moral hazard). PAT considers incentives to be an essential instrument to reduce agent’s
self-serving behavior. It aims at proposing solutions to lessen moral hazard and “offers
insights used in the construction of contracts to guide and influence principal-agent re-
lations in the real world” (Arrow, 1985, p. 38).
An extensive literature has emerged that deals with different kinds of incentives and
their effects on agents’ behavior, both theoretically, experimentally, and empirically.
Most of the considered incentives refer to compensation contracts. There is a multitude
of different compensation schemes, such as piece rates, discretionary bonuses, promo-
tions, efficiency wages, profit sharing, etc., that can be used to align a principal’s and
an agent’s interests (Prendergast, 1999). A body of work shows that relating pay to
performance has indeed incentive effects.4 A popular field of economic research on in-
centive effects of compensation schemes refers to rank order tournaments. A rank order
tournament represents a compensation structure in which individuals compete against
each other for a given set of prizes.5 In contrast to other payment systems, earnings do
3Consider, for example, a situation in which a firm’s owner (principal) assigns a certain task to a
worker (agent). While the owner is interested in maximizing the firm’s (and hence the worker’s)
output, the worker typically aims at minimizing effort costs.
4See e.g. Fernie and Metcalf (1999); Gielen et al. (2010); Lazear (2000); Shearer (2004).
5Examples of such tournaments are promotions or sporting contests.
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not depend on individual’s absolute output but on their performance relative to other
competitors. The prospect of winning the first prizes sets incentives to exert effort (La-
zear and Rosen, 1981). Hence, prize levels and prize distribution are important factors
influencing incentives. As it becomes less likely to win a contest when the number of
participants is large, incentives (i.e. prizes) for winning a competition have to increase
in the number of contestants (Prendergast, 1999). Numerous studies confirm that tour-
naments indeed induce contestants to expend effort6 and that prizes are increasing with
respect to the number of participants.7 Only few studies find that performance is not
affected by prize money.8
Theoretical considerations on rank order tournaments9 largely stem from Lazear and
Rosen’s (1981) early findings that under certain conditions, rank order tournaments
can be superior to other payment schemes. These conditions refer to monitoring costs,
symmetric information, and risk-neutrality.10 The authors argue that if the principal
is able to monitor agent’s effort in a reliable and cost-effective way, input-based wages
will be optimal. “However, when monitoring is difficult, so that workers can alter their
input with less than perfect detection, input-wage schemes invite shirking” (Lazear and
Rosen, 1981, p. 842). If monitoring is difficult or costly, tournaments “can elicit effort
to mitigate the moral hazard problem” (McLaughlin, 1988, p. 225).
To what extent tournaments are able to induce agents to exert effort also depends on
contestants’ ex-ante heterogeneity and information being available. When contestants
are heterogeneous and information is asymmetric, i.e. contestants have knowledge on
6Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a,b) were the first to test with non-experimental data whether tou-
rnaments have incentive effects. Analyzing data from professional golf tournaments they find that
prize level and prize distribution do indeed have incentive effects. The higher the prize level and
differentials, the better is the performance. Furthermore, results indicate that a contestant’s deci-
sion to enter a tournament is affected by the total prize money. Subsequent work mostly confirms
Ehrenberg and Bognanno’s results and the theoretical implication that higher prizes result in better
performance (see e.g. Becker and Huselid (1992); Frick and Prinz (2007); Knoeber and Thurman
(1994); Lynch (2005); Maloney and McCormick (2000)).
7See e.g. Eriksson (1999); Main et al. (1993); Conyon et al. (2001).
8Orszag (1994), for example, finds that performance is unrelated to prize money, while Lynch and Zax
(2000) suggest that better performances in tournaments with larger prize spreads are not due to
incentive but rather selection effects.
9“Tournament theory is a reduced form of an agency model” (Lambert et al., 1993, p. 439).
10Rosen (1986) extended the original theory to multistage elimination tournaments.
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their own ability but no information on competitors’ quality, tournaments are conside-
red to be less efficient than piece rates (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; McLaughlin, 1988).
In such contests, competitors are not sorted efficiently into their own leagues. Hence,
firms consisting of high-quality workers are contaminated by low-quality ones (adverse
selection). But even in the case of full information, heterogeneous tournaments fail to
induce incentive effects. In a two-player tournament, low probability of winning likely
results in the less capable contestant (underdog) reducing his effort to avoid effort costs.
The more capable competitor (favorite) anticipates this reduction and decreases his effort
as well. Accordingly, in asymmetric contests, incentive effects are weak (Knoeber and
Thurman, 1994). Solutions to this incentive problem are handicapping systems or speci-
fic prize structures indexed by participant quality (McLaughlin, 1988). The theoretical
prediction that ex-ante heterogeneity negatively affects performance has been tested in
multiple ways. Most of the results are in line with theory.11
The problem of ex-ante heterogeneity mostly exists in static tournaments, i.e. agents
decide one-time on their behavior. In dynamic tournaments, though, competitors are
able to adjust their behavior over the course of a competition. Here, another trouble can
arise that has similar effects to ex-ante heterogeneity: the availability of intermediate in-
formation. Intermediate information describes the knowledge contestants gain during the
course of the competition about interim results and competitors’ abilities. “The release
of interim information creates endogenous asymmetries between contestants” (Ederer,
2010, p. 738). Information suggesting a victory has been secured can be an impor-
tant determinant of effort exerted, because it determines negative incentives, similar to
ex-ante heterogeneity (McLaughlin, 1988). Experimental and empirical evidence on in-
termediate information is mixed. While some experimental studies find that providing
information does not influence agents’ effort12, other (both experimental and empirical)
works show that contestants adjust behavior according to the release of information13.
11Bach et al. (2009); Berger and Nieken (2016); Brown (2011); Bull et al. (1987); Frick et al. (2008);
Sunde (2009).
12See e.g. Bull et al. (1987); Schotter and Weigelt (1992).
13See e.g. Gu¨rtler and Harbring (2010); Ludwig and Lu¨nser (2012); Azmat and Iriberri (2010); Casas-
Arce and Mart´ınez-Jerez (2009).
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A further condition under which tournaments are more efficient than piece rates refers
to the risk attitude of contestants. “Tournaments successfully elicit effort especially if the
contestants are risk neutral” (McLaughlin, 1988, p. 247). If competitors are risk-averse,
the optimal compensation scheme depends on the utility function and the variance of
chance (Lazear and Rosen, 1981). “Contests may be preferred to individualistic reward
schemes, especially when the risk associated with common environmental variables is
large” (Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983, p. 23). To sum up, tournaments can induce agents to
act in line with principals’ interests. However, certain circumstances can reduce incentive
effects of tournaments, e.g. heterogeneity, intermediate information or risk-aversion.
In general, tournaments aim at increasing the effort choice of agents. However, relative
performance evaluation systems can also affect behavior in other - unintended - ways:
incentives resulting from tournaments can lead to collusion, high risk-taking or sabotage
(Chowdhury and Gu¨rtler, 2015; Genakos and Pagliero, 2012; Harbring, 2006; Kra¨kel and
Sliwka, 2004; Nieken, 2010). Both collusion, risk-taking and sabotage are associated
with negative effects on effort or efficiency. “Whenever compensation by tournaments
[...] are implemented, there is an incentive for the agents involved in the tournaments to
collude in reducing their effort levels, thereby obtaining a simultaneous increase in the
utilities of the colluding participants” (Dye, 1984, p. 148). If agents are able to make
an arrangement prior to the contest (collusion), they will choose low efforts in order to
minimize effort costs (Harbring, 2006).14
In case rewards depend only on the relative performance of participants, decreasing the
performance of the opponent can serve as a substitute for providing effort in tournaments.
That is, sabotage among competitors might occur. Sabotage denotes resources expended
to reduce the winning probability of rivals and typically is associated with illegal, unfair,
or immoral actions. Therefore, sabotage is often characterized as destructive; these costly
actions by one worker to decrease the output of another (Lazear, 1989) have negative
effects on overall welfare (Balafoutas et al., 2012). Competitors expect a positive net
benefit of engaging in sabotage if its costs are lower than the amount of performance
14Harbring (2006) and Sutter and Strassmair (2009) confirm that in case communication between par-
ticipants is possible effort slightly decreases in tournaments.
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reduction by the opponent it induces. Empirical research indicates that the magnitude of
sabotage activities indeed increases with prize spreads in tournaments.15 Several studies
also illustrate that sabotage depends on the homogeneity of contests: Results show that
contestants are more prone to engage in sabotage when ability differences are small.16
Competitors’ variance of performance is affected by their choice of risk, i.e. a higher
risk strategy enlarges both the positive and negative tail of the performance distribution
(Knoeber and Thurman, 1994). Risk-taking per se is not inevitably harmful. However,
high risk strategies are associated with lower selection efficiency (Grund and Gu¨rtler,
2005; Hvide and Kristiansen, 2003; Miller, 2008) and effort (Grund and Gu¨rtler, 2005;
Hvide, 2002; Nieken, 2010). If contestants increase their choice of risk, tournaments
become more noisy so that the outcome of a competition might not be decided by con-
testants’ effort but risk factors. Furthermore, marginal gains of effort decrease with
increasing noise (Nieken, 2010). Therefore, high risk is typically associated with low
effort. A main theoretical prediction is that less able agents typically opt for the risky
strategy while more able agents avoid high-risk strategies (Bronars, 1987; Ederer, 2010;
Grund et al., 2013; Hvide, 2002; Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; Kra¨kel and Sliwka, 2004).
Similar effects are assumed for the release of information: Agents lagging behind are
supposed to increase risk, while contestants leading a competition rather decrease risk.
Several empirical studies confirm this assumption.17
In summary, tournament compensation can - under certain conditions - induce agents
to elicit effort and hence, reduce moral hazard. Relative compensation systems might not
only affect effort but other unintended behavior: collusion, sabotage and high risk-taking
can follow from incentives set by tournaments. The assumptions made by tournament
theory represent well-formulated and empirically or experimentally testable hypotheses.
Hence, extensive literature on tournaments and their effects on contestants’ behavior
exist. Most of the empirical and experimental studies confirm theoretical beliefs. Howe-
15See e.g. Carpenter et al. (2010); Del Corral et al. (2010); Falk et al. (2008); Garicano and Palacios-
Huerta (2014); Harbring and Irlenbusch (2011); Lazear (1989).
16See e.g. Berger and Nieken (2016); Frick et al. (2008); Nieken and Stegh (2010).
17See e.g. Brown et al. (1996); Chevalier and Ellison (1997); Genakos and Pagliero (2012); Grund and
Gu¨rtler (2005); Grund et al. (2013); Knoeber and Thurman (1994); Koski and Pontiff (1999).
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ver, some research gaps still remain. The present dissertation provides new insights into
some of these gaps. First, empirical studies on the impact of intermediate information
on effort are rare at best (Casas-Arce and Mart´ınez-Jerez, 2009; Genakos and Pagliero,
2012). Furthermore, existing work that focus on effort use rather performance than ef-
fort variables since effort is difficult to measure. In an attempt to close this gap, we
present empirical analyses on effort in dynamic tournaments in chapter 2 which is a joint
work with Christian Deutscher.18 In order to analyse the impact of within-tournament
information on effort, we use running data gathered from professional soccer players in
the German Bundesliga and extensive within-game information. Detailed game-level sta-
tistics for each player’s running distance and number of high-intensity runs and sprints
provide proxies for effort. Using sports data offers several advantages: “There is no
research setting other than sports where we know the name, face, and life history of
every production worker and supervisor in the industry” (Kahn, 2000, p. 75). Manifold
statistics on player’s performance are publicly available and can be used to test incen-
tive effects of tournaments. The results presented in chapter 2 indicate strong incentive
effects of intermediate results.
Second, field evidence about sabotage is very scarce. As sabotage typically entails
illegal, unfair, or unethical activities, agents engaging in it try to hide their activities
(Balafoutas et al., 2012; Del Corral et al., 2010). In response to these difficulties, rese-
archers use data from sports competitions, often in static settings. Empirical evidence
about the impact of within-tournament dynamics on sabotage is sparse, and questions
remain about the link between interim results and agents’ sabotaging behavior. There-
fore, further empirical evidence on the impact of interim results on sabotage activities of
contestants is presented in chapter 319. This study is again a joint work with Christian
Deutscher. Using sports data, we analyze the effect of the goal difference at a certain
time of the match on the number of penalized fouls conducted by a team, and to what
18The study presented in chapter 2 is based on the research article “Intermediate Information, Loss
Aversion, and Effort: Empirical Evidence” by Sandra Schneemann and Christian Deutscher. The
article has been published by “Economic Inquiry” (2017, volume 55, issue 4).
19Chapter 3 is based on the article “The Impact of Intermediate Information on Sabotage in Tourna-
ments with Heterogeneous Contestants”, published in “Managerial and Decision Economics” (2017,
volume 38, number 2).
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extent this effect depends on a team’s status of being the favorite or underdog. Results
suggest that intermediate results significantly affect sabotaging behavior of the teams
and that favorites and underdogs differ in their chosen level of sabotage.
Third, while there is growing evidence on the overall impact of intermediate infor-
mation on agents’ risk-taking behavior, empirical findings offer little insights into the
relationship between ex-ante and within-tournament asymmetry regarding risk-taking.
Existing studies mainly focus on only one dimension of asymmetry: (ex-ante) heteroge-
neity relating to ability or asymmetry relating to interim results. Hence, it is not clear,
whether favorites and underdogs react differently to the availability of intermediate in-
formation. Chapter 420 examines the relationship between intermediate information,
risk-taking and heterogeneity in order to reduce this research gap. The study exploits
data from high-stakes contests, namely the knockout rounds of the European soccer
competition ’Champions League’. The empirical analysis focuses on the teams’ coaches
and uses within-game information on their substitution strategies to measure the risk
of their strategy. Results show that interim results (measured by the goal difference at
the time of the substitution) have a significant impact on the risk-taking behavior of
coaches. Results also indicate that favorites and underdogs partly react differently to
within-tournament information.
Fourth, based on Lazear and Rosen’s tournament theory, Ho¨ﬄer and Sliwka (2003)
develop a theoretical model that deals with within-team competition and a principal’s
selection choice under incomplete information about agents’ abilities. It states that a
managerial change can trigger incentives when the within-team competition can be rein-
vigorated. This is only the case when the composition of the team is rather homogeneous.
So far, the theoretical model has not been tested empirically, yet. Chapter 521, a joint
work with Gerd Mu¨hlheusser and Dirk Sliwka, tests the assumptions made by Ho¨ﬄer
and Sliwka (2003) using a large data set on the German Bundesliga. We find that teams
20The article “Risk-Taking Behavior of Heterogeneous Contestants and Its Consequences in Dynamic
Tournaments”, which is based on the study presented in chapter 4, has been submitted to the journal
“The Scandinavian Journal of Economics” recently.
21Chapter 5 refers to the article “The Impact of Managerial Change on Performance: The Role of Team
Heterogeneity”, written by Gerd Mu¨hlheusser, Dirk Sliwka and myself, published in “Economic
Inquiry” (2016, volume 54, number 2).
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who have replaced their coach significantly increase their performance - but only when
the team is sufficiently homogeneous prior to the dismissal.
In addition to incentives economic research refers to another important factor for the
performance of a firm: the contribution of managers. Recent empirical work suggests that
individual managers at the top of a firm significantly affect a firm’s performance.22 The
empirical study presented in chapter 623 , which is a joint work with Gerd Mu¨hlheusser,
Dirk Sliwka, and Niklas Wallmeier, adds to the growing literature by using data from
professional soccer, namely the German Bundesliga. By estimating OLS regressions that
include both team and manager fixed effects, we find that coaches have a significant effect
on a teams’ success and playing style, as prior results confirm. Hence, not only incentive
structures are important determinants for the performance of firms or teams, but the
person at the top of an organization.
The empirical analysis of incentives and the contribution of coaches all base on data
from sporting contests. As explained before, sports data offer several advantages, espe-
cially concerning empirical research about incentive effects resulting from relative com-
pensation systems. Manifold theoretical articles offer numerous testable implications
on incentive effects of rank order tournaments but only few industrial sectors provide
opportunities to test these predictions, “largely since reliable measures of relative perfor-
mance are usually difficult to obtain [...]. In sports competitions, relative performance
measures are typically all that matters and they are well defined” (Szymanski, 2003, p.
468). Performance of sports teams or individual athletes are closely monitored by me-
dia, fans and sports journalists. Detailed statistics on a team’s and individual player’s
performance are (publicly) available. Hence, the sport sector is perfectly suitable for
economic research on factors influencing performance.
Sports data are not only suitable for the investigation of internal questions such as
incentive problems but also for questions relevant from a market perspective, for instance
people’s demand. The topic of demand for sport has become a very popular field of
22See e.g. Bertrand and Schoar (2003); Lazear et al. (2015); Graham et al. (2012).
23The chapter is based on the article “The Contribution of Managers to Organizational Success -
Evidence from German Soccer” by Gerd Mu¨hlheusser, Dirk Sliwka, Niklas Wallmeier and myself,
published (online) in “Journal of Sports Economics”.
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economic research recently. Borland and MacDonald (2003) refer to two reasons for the
growing literature on determinants of demand in sports: First, the demand for sport is
characterized by certain peculiarities.
“Where else, for example, would you find consumers (fans who attend matches)
who then become part of a product that is bought by other consumers (fans who
watch on TV)? Or a situation where consumers do not necessarily like the idea
of unfettered competition between participants on the other side of the market?”
(Borland and MacDonald, 2003, p. 478).
The decision to attend a sporting match is affected by various determinants. Usually
demand mostly depends on economic factors such as the price and income. But in sports
further - rather unusual - aspects are relevant, e.g. the presence of another supplier or the
contest’s uncertainty of outcome (Villar and Guerrero, 2009). Second, due to the rising
economic importance of professional sports knowledge on factors influencing attendance
becomes more and more important for manifold stakeholders, e.g. club managers or
government (Borland and MacDonald, 2003, p. 478). Although there is a large body
of work analyzing determinants of demand in sports, few studies exist that focus on the
impact of “superstars” on attendance. In order to add to the empirical work on demand
we - Christian Deutscher and myself - examine in chapter 7 to what extent the attendance
of hockey matches in Germany and the Czech Republic is affected by the presence of
international stars, namely players from the National Hockey League (NHL).24 We find
that the impact of stars significantly differs between the Czech and the German hockey
league: While in the Czech Republic the assumption that superstars matter is supported,
we find only a negligible impact for the German league.
In the following chapters, the empirical studies mentioned are presented. First, I
present empirical work on the impact of intermediate information and heterogeneity
on effort exerted by agents. After that, my focus shifts from effort to sabotage: Do
agents adjust their sabotaging behavior to interim results and heterogeneity? Third,
I examine the risk-taking behavior of agents and how this is affected by both ex-ante
and within-tournament asymmetry. In the subsequent chapter I illustrate the effect of
24This chapter is a revised version of the research article “The effect of stars on attendance: NHL-
players in the German and Czech hockey league” by Christian Deutscher and Sandra Schneemann,
published in the book “Breaking the Ice: The Economics of Hockey” by Bernd Frick (2017).
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within-team heterogeneity on a team’s performance after a managerial change. Then
empirical research on the contribution of coaches on a team’s success is pointed out. The
final empirical analysis of this dissertation refers to the impact of stars on attendance.
Eventually, my dissertation concludes with a short summary and an outlook for future
research.
11
2 Intermediate Information, Loss Aversion and
Effort: Empirical Evidence from German Soccer
Lazear and Rosen (1981) argue that under certain conditions relative compensation
systems provide optimal incentives in order to induce agents to elicit effort. However,
disparities in ability or the availability of intermediate information about contestants’
performance or relative rankings might reduce these incentive effects (McLaughlin, 1988).
In asymmetric contests the less able agent (underdog) is likely to decrease its effort in
order to avoid effort costs as he knows that the probability of losing the competition
is very high. The more capable competitor (favorite) anticipates this reduction and
decreases its effort as well. Accordingly, asymmetric contests are associated with weak
incentive effects (see Introduction).
The following sections of the chapter refer to the published article:
Schneemann, S. and Deutscher, C. (2017). Intermediate information, loss aversion, and
effort: Empirical evidence. Economic Inquiry, 55(4):1759–1770. doi:10.1111/ecin.12420
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3 The Impact of Intermediate Information on
Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous
Contestants
Many daily activities are characterized by relative performance evaluations that reward
the better or best performer with the largest prize. In various contests, two or more
individuals or teams compete for a sports championship, job promotion, or sales bonuses.
Extensive research into tournaments and their effects on contestants’ performance thus
has emerged in recent decades, mostly based on theoretical work by Lazear and Rosen
(1981), who describe the fundamental incentive and selection effects induced by rank-
order tournaments.
Theoretical models that analyze players’ behavior in rank-order tournaments typically
focus on the effort or investment decisions: The more input a player chooses relative to
her or his opponents, the higher her or his probability of winning the contest (Knoeber
and Thurman, 1994; Kra¨kel, 2008). Yet tournaments might do more than induce agents
to exert effort; they also can lead to unintended (predominantly) negative effects such
as sabotage (see Introduction).
The following sections of the chapter refer to the published article:
Deutscher, C. and Schneemann, S. (2017b). The impact of intermediate information on
sabotage in tournaments with heterogeneous contestants. Managerial and Decision
Economics, 38(2):222–237. doi: 10.1002/mde.2771
13
4 Risk-Taking Behavior of Heterogeneous
Contestants and Its Consequences in Dynamic
Tournaments
Rank order tournaments are used in order to induce agents to elicit effort. However,
tournaments do not only impact the effort choices of agents but also further aspects of
behavior such as sabotage (see chapter 3) or risk-taking (Chowdhury and Gu¨rtler, 2015;
Genakos and Pagliero, 2012; Kra¨kel and Sliwka, 2004; Nieken, 2010).
Sabotage is related to actions taken by one agent to reduce the output of the other
agent(s) (Lazear, 1989; Chowdhury and Gu¨rtler, 2015). Risk-taking behavior in turn
affects competitors’ variance of performance, i.e. a higher risk strategy enlarges both the
positive and negative tail of performance distribution (Knoeber and Thurman, 1994).
Both sabotage and risk-taking are assessed as negative. While sabotage results in reduced
welfare (Balafoutas et al., 2012), risk-taking is associated with lower selection efficiency
(Grund and Gu¨rtler, 2005; Hvide and Kristiansen, 2003; Miller, 2008) and effort (Grund
and Gu¨rtler, 2005; Hvide, 2002; Nieken, 2010). Risk-taking per se is not inevitably
harmful. However, if contestants increase their choices of risk, tournaments become
more noisy so that the outcome of a competition might not be decided by contestants’
effort but risk factors. Furthermore, marginal gains of effort decrease with increasing
noise (Nieken, 2010). Therefore, high risk is typically associated with low effort. As it
can be assumed that the organizer’s payoff increases with selection efficiency and effort,
principals benefit from low risk-taking behavior. Hence, insights into the relationship
between different tournament characteristics and contestants’ decisions on their risk-
taking behavior are of great interest (Genakos and Pagliero, 2012; Grund and Gu¨rtler,
2005).
A major part of risk-taking literature focuses on the relationship between asymme-
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try and risk as it is assumed that an agent’s decision on their risk strategy depends
in particular on the asymmetry between the participating agents. Asymmetry can be
classified into two dimensions: the ex-ante differences in ability and the availability of
intermediate information on the current score of the tournament (Grund et al., 2013).
With reference to ex-ante heterogeneity, a main theoretical prediction is that less able
agents (underdogs) typically opt for the risky strategy while more able agents (favorites)
avoid high-risk strategies (Bronars, 1987; Grund et al., 2013; Hvide, 2002; Knoeber and
Thurman, 1994; Kra¨kel and Sliwka, 2004). As winning respectively losing a tournament
solely depends on the relative performance of the contestants, it doesn’t matter whether
an agent loses by a little or a lot. Therefore, the less able agent might benefit from
increasing the risk of his strategy even though this change in strategy also increases the
probability of an even worse performance. The more able contestant on the other hand
will avoid risky actions as these might derogate his or her advantageous starting position
(Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; Kra¨kel and Sliwka, 2004).
Most of the literature that focuses on the impact of ex-ante heterogeneity refers to
static tournaments, i.e. contestants decide one-time on their (risk-taking) behavior. In
reality, though, tournaments often are dynamic in nature. In dynamic contests, competi-
tors are able to adjust their behavior over the course of a tournament, e.g. to interim in-
formation. “The release of interim information creates endogenous asymmetries between
contestants” (Ederer, 2010, p. 738). Hence, it is assumed that interim information affects
behavior similary to ex-ante heterogeneity: Agents lagging behind (‘within-tournament’
underdogs) tend to increase risk, while leading contestants (‘within-tournament’ favori-
tes) decrease risk.25 Several empirical studies confirm this assumption. They show that
trailing contestants tend to choose higher risk strategies than those in the lead (e.g. Che-
valier and Ellison, 1997; Genakos and Pagliero, 2012; Grund and Gu¨rtler, 2005; Grund
et al., 2013).
While there is growing evidence on the overall impact of intermediate information on
agents’ risk-taking behavior, empirical findings offer little insights into the relationship
25Regarding the impact of interim information on effort see e.g. Aoyagi (2010); Ederer (2010); Gershkov
and Perry (2009) or chapter 2, with reference to intermediate information and sabotage see e.g.
Gu¨rtler et al. (2013) or chapter 3.
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between ex-ante and within-tournament asymmetry regarding risk-taking. Existing stu-
dies mainly focus on only one dimension of asymmetry: (ex-ante) heterogeneity relating
to ability or asymmetry relating to interim results. Hence, it is not clear whether ex-ante
favorites and underdogs react differently to the availability of intermediate information.26
Furthermore, empirical evidence on the impact of risk-taking on performance is still
scarce. To some extent, this can be related to empirical issues; on the one hand it is
difficult to distinguish between agents’ risk-taking behavior and performance (Genakos
and Pagliero, 2012), and on the other hand disentangling risk-taking from sabotage can
be problematic (Grund et al., 2013). Previous results suggest that increasing risk does
not pay off (Grund and Gu¨rtler, 2005; Grund et al., 2013; Bartling et al., 2015).
In order to add further evidence on contestants’ risk-taking behavior within contests,
this study exploits data from high-stakes contests, namely the knockout rounds of the
European soccer competition ‘Champions League’, organized by the Union of European
Football Associations (UEFA). The empirical analysis at hand focuses on the teams’
coaches and uses within-game information on their substitution strategies to measure
the riskiness of their strategy. Depending on the tactical position of the outgoing and
incoming player, a substitution is assessed as risk-increasing or -reducing. Using this
measure, it can be estimated how the risk-taking behavior is affected by intermediate
results, namely the particular score at the time of the substitution. Furthermore, data
enable us to examine the impact of the chosen risk strategy on the outcome of the match.
The present study contributes to the existing literature in two ways: Firstly, it adds
further evidence on the impact of interim results on competitors’ risk-taking behavior
in dynamic tournaments and how risk affects the outcome of a competition. Secondly,
the study’s results provide new insights into the relationship between risk, intermediate
information and ex-ante heterogeneity.
Results confirm the theoretical prediction that trailing agents tend to choose higher
risk strategies whereas the leading competitor chooses a safer strategy. This result holds
when analyzing risk-taking behavior for underdogs and favorites separately. However,
26To the best of our knowledge, the study conducted by Grund et al. (2013) is the only one that
explicitly dwells on risk-taking behavior of favorites and underdogs.
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some differences between favorites and underdogs become apparent; while underdogs
reduce risk by larger amounts than favorites when in the lead, favorites increase risk
by larger amounts when behind with two or more goals. In contrast to intermediate
information, ex-ante heterogeneity has no significant effect on risk. Concluding, results
suggest that the outcome of a match is not affected by the level of the chosen risk.
This chapter is organized as follows: First, a literature review on existing empirical
studies on risk-taking behavior in dynamic tournaments is given (section 4.1). The next
section (4.2) offers information on the UEFA Champions League and the dataset used.
Afterwards, hypotheses are formulated (section 4.3). Section 4.4 presents variables mea-
suring risk, heterogeneity and intermediate information as well as descriptive statistics,
while the following section (4.5) shows the empirical results. The paper concludes with
section 4.6.
4.1 Literature Review: Empirical Evidence on Risk-Taking
Even though there is a growing literature on risk-taking behavior of contestants in dyna-
mic tournaments, empirical evidence on that topic is scarce. Existing studies mostly refer
to mutual fund managers or sporting contests. Relating to the behavior of mutual fund
managers, it is shown that poorly performing funds tend to increase their portfolio risk
at the end of a year to a greater degree than better performing funds, which confirms the
main theoretical prediction about risk-taking (Brown et al., 1996; Chevalier and Ellison,
1997; Koski and Pontiff, 1999). However, Busse (2001) notes that such behavior depends
on the sample structure: Comparing the results of monthly and daily fund returns shows
that the tendency of poorly performing funds to increase their risk is apparent only in
the monthly data. With daily data, this tendency disappears. Furthermore, Kempf et al.
(2009) show that the risk-taking behavior also depends on the employment risk that a
mutual fund manager experiences. If the probability of losing the job is low, relatively
poorly performing managers tend to increase their risk, whereas risk is decreased when
the employment risk is high.
Other empirical studies on that topic analyze the risk-taking behavior of contestants
17
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in dynamic sporting contests. Genakos and Pagliero (2012), for example, study how
contestants’ behavior, i.e. risk-taking and performance, is affected by the availability of
intermediate information on pariticipants’ standings. Using manifold data from weight-
lifting contests they can show that trailing competitors tend to take greater risks than
leading competitors. Genakos and Pagliero measure risk as the weight announced by
a weightlifter prior to the next attempt. The higher the announcement the riskier the
athlete’s strategy. However, the positive relationship between rank and risk applies only
to athletes in (interim) ranks one to six. After these ranks, weightlifters reduce the ris-
kiness of their strategy with increasing rank. The authors explain this result with the
intuition, that the probability to win the contest decreases with increasing deficit, i.e.
weightlifters lagging (far) behind give up.
Grund et al. (2013) empirically explore how intermediate scores affect the risk-taking
behavior of NBA teams. Using the fraction of three-point attempts as a measure of risk-
taking, they find that the intermediate point difference has a significant effect on risk:
The more a team is behind, the riskier is its behavior. They also analyze whether ex-ante
favorites and underdogs adjust their risk strategy differently to intermediate information.
Results reveal that favorites show riskier behavior than underdogs when they are behind.
However, the consequences of an increase in risk-taking behavior are mostly negative.
That is, increasing risk raises the winning probability only if the team is far behind and
in certain time periods.
The study conducted by Mueller-Langer and Andreoli Versbach (2017) also relies on
soccer data, namely data from the UEFA Champions League. They investigate whether
risk strategies differ over the two stages of the knockout rounds.27 They hypothesize that
teams that are behind in score after the first match choose higher risk strategies in the
second match. By comparing the distribution of results and goals of the first and second
game, they find that the risk choices do not differentiate significantly between the two
matches. However, results suggest that teams playing the second match at home choose
higher risk strategies.
Grund and Gu¨rtler (2005) also make use of data from professional soccer (German
27In each knockout round of the Champions League the teams have to compete twice against each other.
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Bundesliga) but deviate from the methodology of the studies mentioned before. They
change the perspective from teams or players to coaches. Grund and Gu¨rtler refer risk
to the coaches’ substitution strategies. A substitution is assessed as risk-decreasing if
a coach exchanges an offensive player (e.g. a forward) for a defensive player (e.g. a
defender) and as risk-increasing the other way round. By investigating whether the goal
difference at the time of a substitution affects the probability of a risk-increasing or
risk-reducing substitution, these authors identify a significant and negative effect on the
former but a significant and positive effect on the latter type of substitutions. That is,
a negative score leads to riskier behavior, whereas a positive score prompts less risky
strategies. They also examine whether the degree of risk-taking affects the score and
point advancement of a team, between the time of the first substitution and the end of
the match. Switching to a riskier strategy is worse than maintaining the initial strategy
though, because increasing risk leads to lower score and point expectations.
Bartling et al. (2015) also use information on the substitution strategy of soccer coa-
ches to operationalize agent’s risk-taking behavior. They exploit data from the German
Bundesliga and the English Premier League. Focus of their study is the effect of refe-
rence points respectively expectations on people’s behavior. They analyze to what extent
players’ and coaches’ behavior depend on whether their team is behind expectations or
not. They refer players’ behavior to the frequency of irregular activities, measured by
the number of cards, and coaches’ behavior to risk-taking, measured by their substitu-
tion strategy (similar to Grund and Gu¨rtler, 2005). Expectations (win, draw or loss)
are operationalized using betting odds. They find that coaches substitute significantly
more often in an offensive way when their team is behind expectations, i.e. betting odds
predict a win but the team is behind in score. Furthermore, results suggest that this
behavior has a negative effect on match outcome.
So far, empirical results tend to confirm the theoretical prediction that agents react to
within-tournament information revealing heterogeneity by adjusting their risk strategy.
It is shown that trailing agents usually switch to riskier strategies, while leading agents
tend to reduce risk. Overall, results suggest that risk has no effect or a negative effect on
the outcome of a competition. Except for Grund et al. (2013), existing studies consider
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only one dimension of asymmetry. In the following, we explicitly focus on both dimen-
sions: ex-ante heterogeneity and within-tournament asymmetry relating to intermediate
information.
4.2 The UEFA Champions League
The present dataset covers seven seasons of the UEFA Champions League (from 2009/10
to 2015/16). The UEFA Champions League (CL) is a European soccer club tournament
organized by the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). The competition is
played parallel to the national championships and is the most prestigious and profitable
contest in Europe.28 Only the best teams of the national European leagues are allowed
to participate in the CL.29
The tournament consists of 5 rounds: group stage, round of sixteen, quarterfinal,
semifinal and final.30 In the group stage, four teams play twice against each other (once
at the home and once away). Each team gains three points for a win, one for a draw and
zero for a loss. The two teams which accumulate most points qualify for the following
knockout round.31 The round of sixteen, the quarterfinal and semifinal consist of two
matches against the same opponent.32 Each team plays one match away and one at its
home stadium. The aggregate score after the second leg decides which team advances
28Real Madrid, e.g., gained around 57 Mio Euro for winning the Champions League
in 2013/14 (http://de.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/OfficialDocument/uefaorg/Finance/
02/11/95/46/2119546 DOWNLOAD.pdf).
29The number of teams per league depends on the rank of the respective league in the 5-year-ranking
of the UEFA, which depends on the results of the leagues’ clubs in the five previous Champions
and European League (another European club competition organized by the UEFA) seasons. The
leagues or rather associations on ranks 1 to 3 (currently England, Germany and Spain) have 4 starting
positions each (3 teams are qualified directly for the group stage + 1 team has to play a qualification
round). The ones ranking 4 to 6 have 3 (2+1) and leagues ranking 7 to 12 have 2 (1+1) starting
positions. Each of the other associated leagues have one starting position for the qualification.
30Prior to the group stage, some teams additionally have to play one to four qualification rounds.
31In case two teams have accumulated the same number of points, the results of the two matches in
which these two teams competed against each other at the group stage decide on which team qualifies
for the next round.
32In the round of sixteen, the winner of a group plays against the runner-up of another group. A group
winner always plays the first game away and the second at home. The fixtures of the quarter and
semi finals are drawn by lot. The first team to be drawn plays the first match at home and the
second away.
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to the next round. In case the aggregate score is tied, the team that scores more away
goals proceeds to the next round. If both teams score the same number of away goals the
teams play an extra time and, if necessary, execute a penalty shootout to decide on the
overall winner. In contrast to the round of sixteen, quarterfinal and semifinal, the final
round consists of a single match only. The venue of the final is determined two years in
advance by the UEFA and therefore is neutral in the vast majority of cases.33
In the empirical analysis we focus only on those CL matches that are played in the
knockout rounds, excluding finals. We exclude the final round of the Champions League
because of its peculiarities compared to the other rounds (single match, neutral venue).
As there might be matches at the group stage that are meaningless because one or both
of the teams are already safely qualified for the next round or have dropped out of the
competition, we decided to exclude all matches at the group stage. Using data from
the knockout rounds of the Champions League offers one major advantage compared to
league data: Each match represents a high-stake competition. While in the course of a
season a league match can be of greater or lesser importance for a team, coach or player,
each knockout match is of crucial importance for the advancement in the competition.
In the course of a season strategies might differ from one match to the other (e.g. strong
players could be spared because the opponent is assessed as very weak or more important
matches are to come), but in the CL each match counts.
Overall, the dataset contains 196 Champions League matches: 112 last 16 matches,
56 quarterfinals, and 28 semifinals. The present dataset includes detailed within-game
information on a minute-by-minute level. For each minute of the match, we know the
exact score of the match, the position of each player on the field and, in case of a
substitution, the positions of the incoming and outgoing players.
4.3 Hypotheses
In the UEFA Champions League knockout rounds two teams compete against each other
for advancing to the next round. A team’s success thereby depends crucially on the
33Since 1992/93, there was only one final with a participating team being the home team: FC Bayern
Munich played (and lost) the final in 2011/12 against Inter Mailand in the Allianz Arena in Munich.
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number of goals scored and conceded. As long as a team has scored more goals than
the opponent, the team will advance to the next round. In case the score is even34, an
overtime has to be played, i.e. chances to win the round remain, but additional effort
has to be exerted. In case a team concedes more goals than it scores it is eliminated
from the contest. The probability of scoring and conceding a goal is thereby affected by
the chosen risk strategy. The riskier the behavior the higher the probability of scoring
and receiving a goal. We therefore expect the goal difference to have a significant effect
on the risk-taking behavior of coaches.
In case a team is ahead, scoring another goal does not change the outcome of the
match, while receiving one or more goals might lead to the elimination from the contest.
Incentives for preventing the opponent from scoring a goal increase, especially when the
team is ahead by only one goal. Hence, a coach should tend to reduce the risk strategy
when in the lead, even though this also reduces the chances to score another goal. This
behavior is expected be most pronounced if a team leads by one goal, because receiving
a single goal would change the match outcome from ‘winning’ to ‘overtime’, thus teams
respectively coaches have much to lose. Previous studies suggest that agents might weigh
potential losses more than gains (loss aversion) (see chapter 2 or Brown, 2011; Genesove
and Mayer, 2001). Therefore, we assume that the reduction in risk is greatest when the
goal difference equals one.
In case a team is behind the argumentation is reverse; in order to prevent the team
from losing the round it has to score at least one goal, while conceding another goal does
not change the outcome. Hence, the coach should switch to a riskier strategy.
In case of an even score both scoring and conceding affect the outcome. While scoring
a goal would result in winning the round, conceding a goal would lead to a team’s
elimination. Therefore, a coach should be more hesitant to adjust the risk strategy with
respect to leading or trailing in a match. This argumentation leads to the following
hypotheses:
34Please note that we have adjusted the goal differences in such a way that an even score always leads
to an overtime to be played. Normally, a draw can also lead to a team’s elimination from the
competition / advancement to the next round.
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Hypothesis 1. Coaches choose less risky strategies when in the lead and in-
crease risk when behind in score.
Hypothesis 2. Coaches opt for the least risky strategy when their teams are
ahead by one goal.
Referring to ex-ante heterogeneity, theory assumes that more able agents (ex-ante
favorite) choose safer strategies than less able agents (underdog) (Bronars, 1987; Grund
et al., 2013; Hvide, 2002; Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; Kra¨kel and Sliwka, 2004). The
next hypothesis to be tested is:
Hypothesis 3. Coaches of favorite teams choose less risky strategies than
coaches of underdogs.
Favorites have higher probabilities of scoring and lower probabilities of receiving a goal
respectively. This also applies for the case that the favorite is behind in score. Therefore,
coaches of favorite teams should be more hesitant to change to a riskier strategy, even
in case the score is negative. Underdogs in turn have lower winning probabilities ex-
ante. In case the underdog is behind in score, they have nothing to lose and therefore
will increase the riskiness of their behavior. In case the favorite is ahead, there is no
need to immediately adjust risk-taking behavior as the risk of conceding a goal is still
small. In case the underdog manages to score a goal while receiving none, they should
be interested in adopting a safer strategy in order to minimize the (high) probability of
receiving a goal. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. Favorites take lower risks than underdogs when behind and
higher risks than underdogs when leading.
Regarding the consequences of risk, we expect that the chosen risk strategy affects
both the probability of scoring and of receiving a goal, respectively. The corresponding
hypothesis reads as follows:
Hypothesis 5. Increasing risk raises the probabilities to score and to concede
a goal.
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4.4 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
4.4.1 Risk-Taking, Intermediate Information and Heterogeneity in Soccer
Risk-taking refers to the variance of performance; choosing a higher risk strategy incre-
ases the probability of changing the outcome of the tournament both in a positive and
negative direction. In soccer, a team’s success critically depends on the number of goals
scored and conceded. Therefore, a higher risk strategy can be interpreted as a behavior
that increases both the probability of scoring and conceding a goal. One possibility to
affect a team’s performance distribution refers to the coach’s substitution strategy: the
more offensive (defensive) an incoming player is compared to the outgoing player, the
higher (lower) the probability of scoring and of conceding a goal, respectively (see Grund
and Gu¨rtler, 2005; Bartling et al., 2015). Therefore, we measure risk-taking by means of
considering coaches’ substitution strategies.
Defenders Midfielders Forwards
Centre Back Defensive MF Centre Forward
Left / Right Defender Offensive MF Secondary Striker
Left / Right MF
Central MF
Left / Right Wing
Tab. 4.1 Classification of (Sub)Positions
Depending on the tactical position of a player, he can be considered to be more or less
offensive respectively defensive. Overall, four main positions can be differentiated: goal-
keepers (G), defenders (DF), midfielders (MF) and forwards (F). Except for goalkeepers,
these positions can again be subdivided into further positions (see Table 4.1).
In order to evaluate the offensive potential of a position, Grund and Gu¨rtler (2005) as
well as Bartling et al. (2015) assign ordinal values to the main positions in the following
order: (goalkeepers,) defenders, midfielders, forwards. Even though it is undoubtful that
a midfield player is less offensive than a forward and more offensive than a defender, this
classification seems rather rough.35 Moreover, it is questionable whether the degree of
35Grund and Gu¨rtler (2005) exclude goalkeepers. Defenders get the value 0, midfielders the value 1 and
forwards the value 2. Bartling et al. (2015) assign the value 1 to goalkeepers, 2 to defenders, 3 to
midfielders and 4 to strikers.
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offensive play is the same for all kinds of midfield players, as these range from defensive to
offensive ones. Therefore, we construct a different kind of offensive measure that relies on
a different dataset that comprises information about all players (N = 2,184) who played
in the season 2015/16 at least once in one of the four best European leagues ‘Premier
League’ (England), ‘Bundesliga’ (Germany), ‘Primera Divisio´n’ (Spain) and ‘Serie A’
(Italy). This dataset contains information on the number of average goals and assists36
per minutes played as well as the exact field position of each player in that season.
By means of these data, we can calculate how many goals plus assists (scorerpoints) a
position37 scores on average per 90 minutes played. As a more offensive style of play
leads to more goals and assists scored on average, we can assign an exact value for its
offensive play to each position. Table 4.2 shows the respective values.38,39
Position Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Goalkeeper 0.002 0.01 182
Defender
Centre Back 0.068 0.168 374
Left / Right Defender 0.113 0.09 371
Midfield
Defensive Midfield 0.112 0.086 176
Central Midfield 0.223 0.147 287
Left / Right Midfield 0.194 0.117 26
Offensive Midfield 0.455 0.235 129
Left / Right Wing 0.456 0.833 305
Forward
Secondary Striker 0.542 0.229 40
Centre Forward 0.588 0.269 294
Total 0.231 0.384 2,184
Tab. 4.2 Average Number of Goals plus Assists per 90 Minutes Played
and Position
Table 4.2 shows that there are great differences regarding the offensive play of midfield
players. While a defensive midfielder scores roughly the same number of scorerpoints
like left or right defenders on average, a wing player almost scores four times as much.
36An assist constitutes an activity carried out by a player, e.g. a pass, that helps another player to
score a goal.
37We group right and left defenders as well as midfielders, as the requirements are the same for right
and left.
38The dataset stems from www.transfermarkt.de.
39The average values and overall ranking for the different positions only slightly deviate from league to
league.
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Overall, the data at hand confirm the common knowledge that goalkeepers are the most
defensive players, followed by defenders (mean DF = 0.09) and midfielders (mean MF
= 0.31). Forwards represent the most offensive position (0.583). In order to evaluate
the coaches’ substitution strategies, we compare the positions of the substituted players
regarding their offensive values, i.e. we determine the difference between scorerpoints of
the incoming and outgoing player as our measure for risk-taking. In case a coach does
not substitute a player in a given minute, the change in risk equals zero (no strategic
adjustments are made).
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Fig. 4.1 Distribution of (Cumulative) Goal Difference
In order to analyze the effect of intermediate information on coaches’ risk-taking be-
havior, we rely on information on the exact goal difference at the time of a substitution.
As the winner of a round depends on the aggregate goal difference of both matches, we
use the cumulative score at the time of a substitution as our measure for intermediate
information, i.e. the goal difference of the second leg includes goals scored and received
in the first game. One problem arises by considering a draw, because at the end of the
second game an even score could have different implications for a team: It could lead to
an extra time being played, a team’s elimination or a team’s advancement. Therefore,
we treat draws differently: a tie that would result in playing an extra time is treated as
a goal difference of zero, whereas a draw that would cause one team to be eliminated
from the tournament and the other team to be advanced to the next round is treated
as a goal difference of -1 (for the team that would be eliminated) and +1, respectively
(for the team that would advance to the next round). Figure 4.1 shows the distribution
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of the goal difference. Overall, there is a high percentage of ties. These mainly refer to
matches played in the first leg, since these matches all start with a tie (0-0) so that we
solely observe draws at the beginning of the first game. As only few observations for
absolute goal differences greater than two are available, we pool all goal differences ≥ 3
/ ≤ -3 together.
In order to analyze whether ex-ante heterogeneity affects the risk-taking behavior of
soccer coaches, we generate a heterogeneity variable that relies on information on the
playing quality of the competing teams, measured by the players’ market values. Existing
studies mainly refer to betting odds when it comes to variables indicating the hetero-
geneity of a contest. However, in the case of the Champions League betting odds seem
rather inappropriate, as the odds for the second leg are affected by the outcome of the first
leg so that odds for the second match might be biased. We therefore make use of data as
to market values. The referring dataset stems from the website www.transfermarkt.de.40
We have information on the market values of both players in the starting line-up and on
the bench. The respective values each refer to the time of the match. For each team we
calculate the average value of the whole team (starting line-up + bench players). As mar-
ket values increase over the seasons, we calculate the relative market value per team.41
Our measure for heterogeneity refers to the difference between the relative market values
of both teams.
In order to test whether favorites and underdogs react differently to intermediate
information, we classify the team that has a higher average market value as the favorite
team (favorite).
40Transfermarkt provides data on player and team values since 2005. Since then more and more studies
make use of this data source, see e.g. Bryson et al. (2013); Franck and Nu¨esch (2011); Frick (2011);
Scelles et al. (2016); Torgler and Schmidt (2007). Salary data from Kicker, the most prominent Ger-
man soccer magazine, and market values from Transfermarkt have proven to be strongly correlated
(see, e.g. Franck and Nu¨esch, 2011, p. 3041).
41First, we calculate the average market value of all teams in the 1/8-finals (per season). Second, we
generate the relative market value by dividing each team’s value by the average market value.
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4.4.2 Control Variables
The riskiness of a coach’s strategy is influenced not only by intermediate information
but also by other factors such as the current team formation, the ‘home-field advantage’,
or previous match events, e.g. a red card shown to a player leading to a sendoff. In
general, a coach might be willing to substitute in a more offensive way when the players
on the field are rather defense-orientated. The more offensive the fielded players are,
the less likely a risky substitution will be. As we have information about the players of
the starting eleven and their respective positions and know the offensive values of the
substituted players, we are aware of a team’s composition at each minute of the match.
Therefore we include a variable that indicates the average offensive value of the players
on the field before the substitution (avg offensive).42 Hence, avg offensive also includes
risk changes prior to the respective substitution.
Empirical results of previous studies indicate a home-field advantage in soccer43, i.e.
the home team wins considerably more often than the away team, resulting in a more
defensive style of play by the away team. We thus include the dummy variable away to
identify whether an observation refers to the home or away team.
In case a red card is shown to a player the respective team has to play the remaining
period with one player less. Coaches often react to a player’s dismissal by substituting
a more offensive player for a more defensive player, especially if the sent off player is
a defending one. Therefore we check the number of red cards shown to a team in
the period prior to a substitution (red cards t−1).44 Furthermore, we consider a dummy
variable indicating whether the respective match is the first or second one (2nd leg).
42In order to account for dismissals due to red cards, we use the average value of scorerpoints in place
of the sum of scorerpoints of all field players.
43See e.g. Clarke and Norman (1995); Courneya and Carron (1992); Nevill and Holder (1999); Nevill
et al. (1996, 2002).
44Including information on the position of the dismissed player does not change the main results and
therefore are not considered in the later estimations.
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4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
In the 196 knockout matches of the seasons 2009/10 to 2015/16, a total of 1,064 substitu-
tions took place. In approximately 75.1% of the cases, the coaches exploit the maximum
number of three substitutions per game, in 20% a coach substitutes twice and in 4.7%
once. In only one case, a coach does not substitute at all in a match.45 As a coach
is not allowed to substitute more than three players, intermediate information or other
incidences cannot impact a coach’s risk strategy after the third substitution. Therefore,
we drop all observations followed by the third substitution.
Data on the number and point in time of the substitutions stem from the official score
sheets from the UEFA, available at http://de.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/. Some
substitutions typically do not refer to tactical decisions made by the coach but other
reasons. These often apply to substitutions executed in the extra- or overtime of a
match, or to substitutions of goalkeepers.46 Therefore, these observations are excluded
from the analysis. Overall, the final dataset comprises 196 matches, 1,002 substitutions,
and 32,895 minute observations.
Outgoing Incoming
Position Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
Centre Back 61 6.09 86 8.58
Left / Right Defender 92 9.18 102 10.18
Defensive Midfield 106 10.58 93 9.28
Central Midfield 154 15.37 143 14.27
Left / Right Midfield 17 1.70 21 2.10
Offensive Midfield 123 12.28 100 9.98
Left / Right Wing 221 22.06 206 20.56
Secondary Striker 52 5.19 36 3.59
Centre Forward 176 17.56 215 21.46
Total 1,002 100 1,002 100
Tab. 4.3 Positions of Substituted Players
Table 4.3 shows the positions of the incoming and outgoing players. Most substituted
45Pep Guardiola, FC Barcelona, 23rd Feb 2016 (against Arsenal FC, 1/8 final)
46In case a team leads in a match by one goal, coaches often substitute in the extratime in order to waste
playing time, thereby reducing the chance of the opposing team to score a goal. In the overtime a
substitution is often due to a player’s exhaustion. Normally, a goalkeeper is substituted only in case
of an injury or a red card shown to the starting goalkeeper.
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players are wing players, followed by centre forwards. Altogether, 62% (56%) of the out-
going (incoming) players are midfield players, 22.8% (25%) forwards and 15.3% (18.8%)
defenders. Coaches substitute players of the same main position most frequently, as
can be seen from Table 4.4. Substituting a very offensive (forward) for a very defensive
(defender) player and vice versa rarely occurs (2.5%).
Outgoing Incoming Freq. Percent
Defender ↔ Defender 99 9.88
Defender ↔ Midfield 41 4.09
Defender ↔ Forward 13 1.3
Midfield ↔ Defender 77 7.68
Midfield ↔ Midfield 425 42.42
Midfield ↔ Forward 119 11.88
Forward ↔ Defender 12 1.2
Forward ↔ Midfield 97 9.68
Forward ↔ Forward 119 11.88
Total 1,002 100
Tab. 4.4 Substitution Strategies
With reference to our measure for risk-taking, the three substitution strategies are
almost uniformly distributed: 34.33% of the substitutions are risk reducing, 32.34% risk
neutral and 33.33% risk increasing, resulting in a mean value of approximately zero
(see Table 4.5). Table 4.5 also shows that favorites tend to substitute less offensively
respectively risky than underdogs, which is in line with the theoretical assumption.47
Variable Sample Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
risk substitution 1,002 -0.003 0.201 -0.520 0.520
risk overall 32,895 0.000 0.035 -0.520 0.520
favorite 16,550 -0.0005 0.034 -0.520 0.476
underdog 16,345 0.0003 0.036 -0.520 0.520
- The substitution sample refers to only those minutes in which a substitution takes place,
while the overall sample comprises all observations included in the later regressions.
Tab. 4.5 Descriptive Statistics for Risk
Most substitutions take place in the second half of a match (see left part of Figure 4.2).
Overall, only 5.65% of the substitutions are conducted in the first 45 minutes. Coaches
substitute most frequently between the 66th and 85th minute (56.6%). In the first 30
47A t-test is significant on a 5% level.
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minutes of the second half, coaches’ strategy adjustments are mainly risk increasing,
whereas substitutions after minute 75 are mostly risk reducing ones (see right part of
Figure 4.2). The closer it comes to the end of the match, the more defensive is an
incoming player compared to the outgoing player.
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Fig. 4.2 Point in Time, Substitutions and Risk
Figure 4.3 confirms theoretical assumptions that lagging contestants tend to chose
higher risk strategies than leading contestants. On average, highest risk is taken by a
coach when his team trails by one goal. A coach tends to decrease the risk by the largest
amount in case his team leads the match by two goals. The right part of Figure 4.3
illustrates the mean risk-taking behavior of favorites and underdogs seperately. Overall,
it shows that both favorites and underdogs choose higher risk strategies when they are
behind and lower risk strategies when they lead the match. However, underdogs tend
to take more risk than favorites when being slightly behind (goal difference =-1) and
reduce risk to a larger amount when in the lead.
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Table 4.6 shows descriptive statistics for the control variables considered. On average,
the players on the field are as offensive as a central midfield player. About half of the
observations refer to away matches and 2nd leg matches. Overall, 3% of all observations
take place after a player is sent off the field. A total of 34 players had to leave the field
due to a red card. As explained above, most of the observations refer to an even score.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
heterogeneity 32895 0.006 0.902 -2.305 2.305
avg offensive 32895 0.231 0.020 0.134 0.319
away 32895 0.501 0.500 0 1
red cardst−1 32895 0.030 0.172 0 1
2nd leg 32895 0.494 0.500 0 1
goaldifference 32895 0.021 1.630 -8 8
goaldiff ≥+3 32895 0.056 0.230 0 1
goaldiff +2 32895 0.090 0.286 0 1
goaldiff +1 32895 0.202 0.402 0 1
goaldiff 0 32895 0.319 0.466 0 1
goaldiff −1 32895 0.194 0.396 0 1
goaldiff −2 32895 0.086 0.280 0 1
goaldiff ≤−3 32895 0.053 0.225 0 1
Tab. 4.6 Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
4.5 Results
Our empirical analysis first focuses on the overall relationship between intermediate in-
formation, heterogeneity and risk. We test whether the current goal difference affects
the coaches’ risk strategy. The dependent variable risk refers to the difference between
the average scorerpoints of the outgoing and incoming player. The ordinary least squa-
res (OLS) regression shows that intermediate information significantly impacts coaches’
risk-taking behavior, while ex-ante heterogeneity proves to be insignificant (see Table
4.7). The result is robust across the three models which differ in the fixed effects con-
sidered. On average, trailing teams increase and leading teams reduce the riskiness of
their strategy. Coaches switch to riskiest strategies when their team is behind by one (or
two) goals. The increase in risk-taking by trailing teams and reduction by leading teams
is in accordance with Hypothesis 1. As coaches choose safest strategies when their team
is ahead by two or three goals, Hypothesis 2 has to be rejected.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
goaldiff ≥+3 -0.0037*** -0.0039*** -0.0046***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014)
goaldiff+2 -0.0038*** -0.0047*** -0.0052***
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
goaldiff+1 -0.0017*** -0.0019*** -0.0023***
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
goaldiff−1 0.0024*** 0.0026*** 0.0025***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
goaldiff−2 0.0019** 0.0023** 0.0025***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
goaldiff≤−3 0.0018 0.0023 0.0024
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0015)
heterogeneity 0.0001 -0.0014 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0010)
away -0.0007* -0.0008** -0.0008**
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
red cardst−1 -0.0053*** -0.0053*** -0.0049***
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018)
2nd leg 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
avg offensive -0.0386*** -0.0623*** -0.0793***
(0.0127) (0.0161) (0.0174)
Season dummies yes yes yes
Minute dummies yes yes yes
Team dummies no yes yes
Opponent dummies no yes yes
Coach dummies no no yes
R2 0.009 0.013 0.014
Adj. R2 0.006 0.007 0.007
Obs. 32895 32895 32895
- dependent variable: risk
- Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
- Clustered on team-match-level
Tab. 4.7 OLS Regression Results: Impact of Intermediate Information and
Heterogeneity on Risk
The theoretical assumption that more able agents choose less risky strategies cannot
be confirmed. The variable heterogeneity has no significant effect on the dependent
variable risk. Hence, Hypothesis 3 has to be rejected.48 As expected, teams are more
hesitant to play an offensive style of play when playing away; away is significant and
negative. Losing a player due to a red card also affects risk negatively. As losing a player
leads to an increased probability to concede a goal, coaches seemingly want to reduce
48The inclusion of an interaction term favorite*goaldifference confirms this result: Both favorite and
the interaction term are insignificant. See Appendix, Table 4.10.
33
4 Risk-Taking: Intermediate Information, Heterogeneity and Success
this probability by substituting a more offensive player for a more defensive one.49 The
formation on the field has a significant effect on the risk strategy, too. The more offensive
the current players on the field are the less offensive the incoming player is on average.
In a next step and in order to test whether favorites and underdogs react differently
to interim results, we perform the OLS regression of Model 3 separately for favorites and
underdogs (see Table 4.8). Overall, underdogs and favorites both react to interim results
by adjusting their risk strategy. However, some differences in the risk-taking behavior
can be found. In case a team is leading, the decrease in risk-taking is more pronounced
for underdogs than favorite teams, which is in line with Hypothesis 4. The coefficients
of goaldiff +2 and goaldiff +1 are twice as high for underdogs as for favorites. Underdogs
might adjust their risk strategy to a larger extent when in the lead in order to compensate
the ex-ante larger likelihood to concede a goal. The fact that goaldiff ≥+3 is insignificant
could be due to the small fraction of underdogs leading a match by three or more goals. 50
Differences between favorites and underdogs are also apparent when the goal difference
is negative. Regarding the coefficient of goaldiff −1 underdogs and favorites react as
expected: Underdogs choose riskier strategies than favorites to increase their chances to
score a goal. Again the coefficient is almost twice as high compared to the coefficient of
favorites. This again is consistent with Hypothesis 4. However, our assumption regarding
trailing favorites does not hold for goal differences ≤ -2. In case the team is behind by two
or more goals, the increase in risk is more pronounced for favorites than for underdogs.
Regarding favorite teams, risk increases with the intermediate goal difference; the larger
the deficit the more risks the coach of the favorite team takes. Underdogs in turn do
not react to a high deficit by adjusting risk. goaldiff ≤−3 proves to be insignificant. Some
coaches of underdogs trailing far behind might realize that the goal difference is too large
to have any chance to catch up and therefore might switch from a risky to a defensive
strategy in order to prevent the team from disgrace.
Interestingly, coaches of favorite teams do not distinguish between home and away
49Results remain the same when including a variable capturing the position of the dismissed player into
the regression.
50Only 380 observations (2.3%) refer to an underdog leading a match by three or more goals.
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matches. Playing away does not affect favorite’s risk strategy while underdogs adjust
risk to the venue. Furthermore, underdogs tend to increase their risk-taking behavior in
the second leg while favorites do not differentiate between the first and second match.
Model 1 Model 2
Underdog Favorite
goaldiff ≥+3 -0.0034 -0.0046**
(0.0024) (0.0019)
goaldiff +2 -0.0080*** -0.0041***
(0.0021) (0.0013)
goaldiff +1 -0.0032*** -0.0016*
(0.0011) (0.0009)
goaldiff −1 0.0031*** 0.0019**
(0.0009) (0.0009)
goaldiff −2 0.0022* 0.0039**
(0.0012) (0.0018)
goaldiff ≤−3 0.0007 0.0076***
(0.0021) (0.0025)
away -0.0012** -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0005)
2nd leg 0.0011* 0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0006)
red cardst−1 -0.0064*** -0.0059**
(0.0024) (0.0029)
avg offensive -0.1142*** -0.0738***
(0.0250) (0.0279)
Season dummies yes yes
Minute dummies yes yes
Team dummies yes yes
Opponent dummies yes yes
Coach dummies yes yes
R2 0.021 0.016
Adj. R2 0.010 0.005
Obs. 16345 16550
- dependent variable: risk
- Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
- Clustered on team-match-level
Tab. 4.8 OLS Regression Results: Favorite vs. Underdog
Overall, risk-taking behavior of favorites and underdogs show similar tendencies: trai-
ling teams tend to choose riskier strategies and leading teams take fewer risks. While
underdogs maximize risk when the deficit is small, favorites increase risk the most when
they are trailing with a clear deficit. The latter is in support of Bartling et al. (2015) who
find that teams that are unexpectedly behind increase risk to a larger extent than teams
not being unexpectedly behind. They explain this behavior with pressure, nervousness
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or frustration which might lead to irrationality (Bartling et al., 2015, p. 2650).
In order to analyze the impact of risk on the winning probability, we have performed
several logit and OLS regressions. As the winning probability crucially depends on the
probability to score and to concede a goal, we estimate the impact of risk on goals scored
and conceded in a given minute respectively. Because of the incidental parameters’
problem of fixed effects in nonlinear models with limited time periods, we use OLS
instead of logit when including team and opponent fixed effects (Haas and Nu¨esch, 2012,
p. 3110).
As our measure for risk we use a team’s average offensive in the given minute of the
match.51 The higher avg offensive the more likely it should be to score and receive a goal
respectively as the coach takes more risks by fielding more offensive players. Furthermore,
we control for the goal difference prior to and match events in the particular minute.
Those match events refer to incidences that consumes time and therefore reduce the
probability of scoring and conceding a goal respectively, e.g. the number of substitutions
in t (substitutionst) or whether the other team has scored a goal in t (goalt / goal againstt).
In addition we control for the minute played (minute) and include a dummy indicating
the 45th minute because this minute includes the extratime of the 1st half and therefore
takes longer than the other minutes.52 As a player’s dismissal might derogate a team’s
scoring probability, we account for the number of sentoffs of the two teams prior to the
given minute (red cardst−1 / red cardst−1 opponent). In case a team scored a goal shortly
before t, it might rest on this success, or the opponent might even fight harder for a goal
of their own. Therefore, we include dummy variables accounting for the event of a goal
scored and received in the 5 minutes prior to t respectively. Finally, we include a dummy
variable indicating the favorite team and control for being the away team.
To sum up, the results all suggest that risk does not affect the probability of scoring and
receiving a goal respectively (see Table 4.9). In none of the models the risk variable avg
offensive is significant. This result does not change when including team and opponent
51Using two variables measuring the offensive of the starting eleven and the cumulative value of the risk
variable separately does not change the main results.
52This problem only arises for the 1st half, for the second half we have information for each minute of
the extratime.
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logit OLS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Goal
Goal
Goal
Goal
Goal
Goal
dep. Variable: against against against
avg offensive 1.1964 -0.2120 -0.0015 0.0120 0.0006 0.0129
(2.1342) (1.9084) (0.0332) (0.0360) (0.0336) (0.0357)
goal differencet−1 0.0283 -0.0282 -0.0007 0.0007 -0.0037 -0.0005
(0.0306) (0.0296) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0039) (0.0037)
goal difference * offensive 0.0130 0.0050
(0.0170) (0.0162)
substitutionst -1.0304*** -1.0300*** -0.0106*** -0.0106*** -0.0106*** -0.0106***
(0.3096) (0.3096) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
goal againstt -1.3736* -0.0105*** -0.0105***
(0.7123) (0.0027) (0.0027)
goalt -1.3727* -0.0105*** -0.0105***
(0.7124) (0.0027) (0.0027)
minute 45 0.8317*** 0.8295*** 0.0177** 0.0177** 0.0176** 0.0177**
(0.2919) (0.2917) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088)
minute 0.0064*** 0.0064*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
red cardst−1 -0.5265* 0.5314*** -0.0054* 0.0134*** -0.0055* 0.0134***
(0.2937) (0.1654) (0.0030) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0039)
red cardst−1 opponent 0.5336*** -0.5385* 0.0133*** -0.0054* 0.0133*** -0.0054*
(0.1602) (0.2955) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0039) (0.0030)
goal scored last 5 min -0.3415** 0.0794 -0.0070*** -0.0002 -0.0070*** -0.0002
(0.1651) (0.1694) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023)
goal conceded last 5 min -0.0105 -0.3402** -0.0013 -0.0070*** -0.0013 -0.0070***
(0.1773) (0.1681) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)
favorite 0.4769*** -0.4787*** -0.0006 0.0007 -0.0007 0.0007
(0.0929) (0.0931) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
away -0.3878*** 0.3914*** -0.0061*** 0.0062*** -0.0062*** 0.0062***
(0.0921) (0.0907) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Constant -4.8515*** -4.4440***
(0.5124) (0.4387)
Team dummies no no yes yes yes yes
Opponent dummies no no yes yes yes yes
Pseudo-R2 0.021 0.021
R2 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Adj. R2 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Obs. 38200 38200 38200 38200 38200 38200
- Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
- Clustered on team-match-level
Tab. 4.9 Regression Results: Impact of Risk on Goals Scored and Conce-
ded
fixed effects (Model 3-6) or an interaction term for risk and goal difference (Model 5-6).
Further regressions with an alternative risk variable (e.g. the cumulative value of risk),
additional control variables and interaction terms or using different sub samples (favorites
and underdogs, trailing or leading teams, only even matches) confirm this result.53 In
neither of the regressions does risk affect the dependent variable significantly. Thus,
Hypothesis 5 has to be rejected.
In contrast to risk, most of the other controls affect the likelihood of changing the
53Detailed regression results are provided upon request.
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match outcome significantly in all of the models (except for goal differencet−1 and in
part favorite). Whether a team is behind or ahead has no effect on the probability of
scoring or receiving another goal. Match events taking place in t in turn significantly
reduce the scoring probability while in the course of the match (minute) and especially in
the 45th minute significantly more goals are scored. Suffering a sentoff has – as expected
– a negative and (slightly) significant effect on the likelihood of scoring. The argument
is reversed for sentoffs of the opponent. In case a team has scored a goal shortly before
t, the probability of scoring another goal is significantly reduced while conceding a goal
has no effect on scoring, and vice versa. Being the away team has a significant and
negative effect on scoring a goal and a significant and positive impact on conceding a
goal respectively. The favorite team in turn scores more and concedes fewer goals, but
favorite is significant only when team and opponent fixed effects are not included (Model
3-6). Results are robust across the different models.
As the risk strategy has no effect on the match outcome, it is questionable why coaches
adjust their risk strategy in the common way. Picking up on the argument of Grund
et al. (2013), the coaches’ behavior may be based on an overestimation of risk-taking and
/ or public pressure. Although a coach may be aware that choosing a riskier strategy
may not change the situation and reducing risk does not increase chances to win on
average respectively, he could still believe that in particular cases a strategic adjustment
leads to success. Furthermore, spectators may think that a coach gives up, if he sticks to
the initial strategy even though his team trails behind. As a coach may want to signal
that everything possible is being done in order to change the match outcome, he may
increase risk-taking even though he knows that this does not change anything. Another
explanation is that pressure and stress lead to irrational behavior (Grund et al., 2013).
4.6 Conclusion
The present study provides evidence on the risk-taking behavior of contestants. Results
show that both trailing and leading teams adjust risk. While coaches of teams that are
behind take more risks, coaches of leading teams decrease the risk strategy. Favorites
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take more risks than underdogs when trailing by more than one goal, whereas underdogs
decrease risk by a larger amount when leading in a match. Ex-ante heterogeneity does
not affect the choice of risk significantly. Both increasing and reducing risk prove to
have no effect on the match outcome. Neither does the likelihood of receiving a goal
decrease by less risk-taking nor do teams score more goals by increasing risk. As higher
risk-taking typically results in less effort exerted by agents, insights into the relationship
between different contest designs and the risk-taking behavior of contestants are of high
importance. This study therefore focuses on the relationship between interim results and
the risk strategy of heterogeneous agents on the one hand, and on the consequences of
risk regarding the outcome of the competition on the other hand. In case of asymmetric
contests, handicaps are often mentioned in order to increase homogeneity and therefore
effort levels. Results show that handicaps have to be chosen very carefully, as these might
result in higher risks and hence lower effort, i.e. trailing contestants might increase their
risk strategy which in turn reduces effort exerted.
Although our analysis confirms existing results, some limitations have to be mentioned.
First, we can only observe coaches’ substitution strategies but have no information on
potential tactical changes besides substitutions. It could be the case that in the course
of a match a player who starts as a right or left defender more and more plays like a
left or right midfield player. Unfortunately, changes in the style of play independent
of substitutions are unobservable for us. Our measure for risk relies on the coaches’
behavior but those who implement the respective risk strategy are the players. But the
actual behavior of the players cannot be observed so that our measure for risk is rather
rough.
Second, the ruling that away goals are more valuable than home goals might lead to
under- or overestimated coefficients. In case a team is behind by one goal, scoring a
single goal can lead to all three possible outcomes: elimination, overtime or winning the
round. Therefore the coefficients of goaldiff +1, goaldiff 0 and goaldiff −1 can be biased.
Third, we cannot differentiate between substitutions due to tactical changes and sub-
stitutions due to other reasons, e.g. injuries, bad performance, threat of being sent off
etc. In case a coach has to substitute a player based on other reasons, his risk adjustments
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might be different compared to tactical substitutions.
Therefore, further research is necessary to add supplementary evidence on the rela-
tionship between interim results and risk-taking behavior of heterogeneous contestants
in dynamic tournaments. Furthermore, it is assumed that risk and effort choices affect
each other (Nieken, 2010) but empirical evidence on that assumption is very rare. Fu-
ture (empirical) research may focus on the interrelation between effort and risk-taking
behavior of contestants. It could also be interesting to test whether certain tournament
designs that have an impact on contestants’ effort choices (e.g. prize spread, number of
participants) also affect agents’ risk strategy.
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4.7 Appendix
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
goaldifference -0.0011*** -0.0012*** -0.0013***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
heterogeneity*goaldiff -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
heterogeneity 0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0011)
away -0.0005 -0.0006* -0.0007**
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
red cardst−1 -0.0052*** -0.0052*** -0.0047**
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
2nd leg 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
avg offensive -0.0360*** -0.0605*** -0.0787***
(0.0127) (0.0162) (0.0175)
Season dummies yes yes yes
Minute dummies yes yes yes
Team dummies no yes yes
Opponent dummies no yes yes
Coach dummies no no yes
R2 0.008 0.012 0.013
Adj. R2 0.005 0.006 0.006
Obs. 32895 32895 32895
- dependent variable: risk
- Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
- Clustered on team-match-level
Tab. 4.10 Determinants of Risk: Interacting Goal Difference and Hetero-
geneity
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7 The Effect of Stars on Attendance: NHL-Players
in the German and Czech Hockey League
Labor disputes between team owners and players’ associations are a common phenome-
non in North American sports. In case a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
has to be negotiated and owners and players cannot come to an agreement, the follo-
wing season is at stake. As negotiations often last for some time it is not unusual that
the upcoming season is shortened. However, it is also possible that the entire season
is canceled, as has happened in the 2004/05 National Hockey League (NHL) lockout.
When the CBA of the NHL expired in 2012 and it became clear that team owners and
the National Hockey League Players’ Association (NHLPA) could not agree on the con-
ditions of the new CBA54, many players left the NHL prior to the 2012/13 season in
order to play professional hockey in Europe. The uncertainty about the season’s begin-
ning respectively the threat of cancellation of the whole season prompted 170 players
to close temporary contracts with European teams by November 2012. Since most of
the European leagues restrict the number of foreign players per team, the majority of
NHL-players joined teams in their home country. The fact that many NHL-players got
involved with European clubs caused high media attention in America. ESPN, a major
American sports channel, even broadcasted games from Europe during the NHL lockout.
Following successful negotiations between the National Hockey League and its players’
association on January 6th, 2013, the players returned to North America in order to
*This chapter is a revised version of the research article “The effect of stars on attendance: NHL-
players in the German and Czech hockey league” by Christian Deutscher and Sandra Schneemann,
published in the book “Breaking the Ice: The Economics of Hockey” by Bernd Frick (2017).
54There were major conflicts regarding financial determinants, namely the scope and distribution of
hockey-related revenues, a fixed salary cap, the contract length and free agency rules. Mediation
by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service discontinued after a few days in November due
to unsuccessful discussions with the negotiating parties. The league repeatedly canceled games as
negotiations continued to fail throughout the month of December.
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prepare for the shortened season that started on January 19th, 2013 - more than three
month after its original start.
While sports economists have comprehensively investigated the impact of the NHL
lockout on North American demand, little to nothing is known about its consequences
for hockey and its demand in Europe. This is surprising since this situation serves as a
rare chance to determine the effect of stars on attendance. As the NHL is appraised to be
the best hockey league worldwide, NHL-players can be considered as being of superior
ability - or stars - in minor leagues, such as the German DEL (Deutsche Eishockey
Liga) or the Czech Extraliga. A total of 28 (12) NHL-players signed contracts with
Czech (German) clubs during lasting negotiations between the NHL and the NHLPA.
The players stayed on average for 18 matches in Europe. Hence, it is possible to analyze
whether the arrival of NHL-players affected attendance in the Czech and German highest
hockey league. This chapter examines the relationship between demand and the presence
of NHL-players by using game level data from the two European leagus. In order to have
sufficient observations for matches with and without stars, we include information about
the season before the lockout (2011/12) as well as during the lockout (2012/13) into
our analysis. We find that ‘stars’ affect demand differently in the Czech Republic and
Germany: While NHL-players attracted significantly more spectators in the Extraliga,
especially if they played for the away team, we only find a negligible effect of stars playing
for the home team in the DEL. Stars who played for the away team did not increase
demand for DEL matches at all. As the obligation of NHL-players was very costly for
European clubs55, it is questionable whether German teams could benefit from signing
a NHL-player.
The chapter starts with a review of literature on the demand for sports and hockey.
In section 7.2 we describe the two European leagues under consideration in more detail.
Section 7.3 presents the data at hand and the empirical approach. In section 7.4 we
illustrate the results of our estimations. Finally, we summarize the insights of the chapter
and offer implications in section 7.5.
55Depending on age, contract value and injury history, teams had to pay insurance fees between $20,000
and $70,000 per player for the two month span plus individual salaries (http://www.espn.com/nhl/
story/ /id/8403261/playing-europe-russia-easy-accomplish-locked-players).
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7.1 Literature Review
This section offers an overview on the related literature in order to provide a basis for
the empirical analysis in section 7.3. We start with studies that investigate determinants
of demand for sports in general and hockey in particular. As we focus on the effect of
stars on attendance subsequently, we also present empirical evidence on this topic.
7.1.1 Surveys on Determinants of Attendance in Sports
Borland and MacDonald (2003) as well as Villar and Guerrero (2009) survey literature
on determinants of demand for sporting contests. First, Borland and MacDonald (2003)
discuss the product of professional sport to suggest five categories which determine the
demand for sporting competitions: consumer preferences, economic factors, the quality
of viewing, characteristics of the contest and the supply capacity (p. 481ff.). Borland
and MacDonald (2003) argue that consumer preferences for sporting goods are more
complex than preferences for other goods, as team loyalty, bandwagon effects and the
striving for prestige determine the demand for sports contests. Regarding economic fac-
tors the authors expect ticket prices, opportunity and travel costs, income of potential
fans, the market size, unemployment rate and substitutes to affect attendance. The qua-
lity of viewing is influenced by the conditions of viewing, time and day of the contest,
weather conditions and the existence of adequate food and sanitary facilities. Borland
and MacDonald (2003) refer the characteristics of a contest to the qualities of the re-
spective teams, the presence of star players, relevance of a match, winning probability
of the home team and uncertainty of outcome. The supply capacity can also affect de-
mand as it constrains match attendance. After presenting the main determinants of
demand, the authors give a review of existing literature on these determinants. Borland
and MacDonald show that findings concerning the impact of star players on attendance
are mixed: while some studies find a positive effect of stars on demand, others reject
the assumption that stars affect attendance.56 They conclude that various factors affect
attendance and have to be considered in empirical analyses respectively.
56See e.g. Schofield (1983); Kahn and Sherer (1988); Hausman and Leonard (1997).
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Villar and Guerrero (2009) also overview (mostly empirical) research on demand in
the field of sports economics. In contrast to Borland and MacDonald (2003), they put
stronger emphasis on methods and variables used in the empirical literature. The aut-
hors review different definitions of attendance, e.g. average attendance, logarithm of
attendance or proportion of tickets sold, and criticize that some studies do not consider
the problem of restricted capacity as they apply simple OLS regression although more
appropriate econometric methods are at hand, e.g. Tobit models. Afterward, distinct
factors that have proven to determine the attendance of a sporting contest are conside-
red: economic factors, the quality of the contest, uncertainty of outcome, opportunity
costs and other aspects. Villar and Guerrero identify economic indicators comparable
to those presented by Borland and MacDonald: ticket price, complementary and sub-
stitute goods, income, unemployment, market size, stadium capacity and strikes. The
same is true for the quality of a contest. Villar and Guerrero suggest that the winning
probability of the home team, the expected quality of both teams, presence of superstars,
rivalry between the teams and recent performance of the home team affect the quality
of a match. Regarding the uncertainty of outcome, the authors distinguish between ma-
tch, seasonal and long-term uncertainty. They present evidence for a negative effect of
a low long-term uncertainty on attendance. Finally, Villar and Guerrero illustrate that
opportunity costs and other factors such as weather, TV broadcasting, day and time of
the contest, parallel competitions of other sports, the distance between the cities of the
home and away team, advertising and the racial composition of the teams also affect the
demand for sporting contests.
7.1.2 Analyzing Determinants of Attendance in Hockey
Studies that examine attendance in hockey often refer to the NHL. Most of these studies
focus on the impact of violence on demand (Jones et al., 1993; Coates et al., 2012; Stewart
et al., 1992; Paul, 2003; Paul and Weinbach, 2011). However, other determinants are also
tested. Coates and Humphreys (2012), for example, analyze the effect of uncertainty of
outcome while both Jones and Ferguson (1988) and Cocco and Jones (1997) examine
whether demand depends on a team’s (re)location. Furthermore, Leadley and Zygmont
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(2006) determine the impact of new arenas on attendance and Winfree and Fort (2008)
as well as Rascher et al. (2009) study the impact of the NHL Lockout 2004/05 on fan
behavior. The following presents these studies in more detail.
Studies with a focus on violence mostly find a positive effect of fighting on demand for
hockey matches, e.g. Jones et al. (1993), Stewart et al. (1992) and Paul (2003). Jones
et al. (1993) find that violence and match attendance are positively related to each other
and therefore confirm the ‘blood sport’ hypothesis. The positive relationship between
violence and attendance is confirmed for NHL matches both in the USA and Canada.
However, a negative relationship between attendance and extreme forms of violence
is found for matches that are hosted in Canada. On the contrary, major penalties
increase attendance in matches that take place in the US. Stewart et al. (1992) present
another study on demand for hockey. They assess teams as profit maximizers that
offer the product ‘sporting competition’. Violence can be considered as an important
component of this product. The authors assume that violence influences demand directly
as well as indirectly. They argue that violence is a major determinant of attendance and
hence, affects demand directly. Furthermore, Stewart et al. state that violence may
have a positive impact on a team’s winning probability. As the prospect of a home
win is positively related to attendance, violence can increase demand indirectly. The
authors present empirical results which confirm the previous assumptions. They show
that violence affects attendance both directly and indirectly.
Paul (2003) investigates the impact of certain policy changes concerning fighting and
scoring on demand for NHL games. Policy changes were introduced in order to reduce the
amount of exercised violence and to increase the probability of scoring. League organizers
hoped that less violence and more goals would result in higher attractiveness of the play
which in turn should attract more fans. However, the empirical analysis shows that
fighting is positively and scoring negatively related to attendance. Teams that exercise
a higher amount of violence attract more fans, especially in the USA, while the average
number of previously scored goals is negatively related to attendance. Hence, Paul (2003)
confirms that violence positively affects demand for hockey matches. In contrast to Jones
et al. (1993), Stewart et al. (1992), Paul (2003), the studies of Paul and Weinbach (2011)
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and Coates et al. (2012) find that fighting does not affect attendance significantly.
Paul and Weinbach apply data from the Quebec Major Junior Hockey League (QM-
JHL) while Coates et al. use information on the German Hockey League (DEL), the
Finnish SM-liiga and the NHL. Results of the QMJHL indicate that the win percentage
of the home team increases attendance significantly, while scoring and fighting do not
attract more fans. Coates et al. (2012) find that both success and attendance are not
related to violence. In an additional study, Coates and Humphreys (2012) focus on anot-
her determinant of attendance: the uncertainty of outcome. Using data from the NHL,
regression results indicate that fans prefer matches in which the home team is expected
to win over even matches. The authors attribute this result to loss aversion. Further-
more, they show that attendance is positively affected by scoring and negatively affected
by receiving goals and penalties. Coates and Humphreys conclude that the negative
relationship between penalties and attendance justifies policies released by the NHL to
curb violence.
Leadley and Zygmont (2006) focus on the quality of viewing, namely the impact of
an arena’s modernity, on demand. Data from the NHL show that an arena attracts
approximately 15 to 20 percent more fans in the first year after opening, confirming that
the age / modernity of an arena is an important factor for attendance. The length of
this so-called ‘honeymoon effect’ lasts between five to eight years and depends on the
considered period (Miller, 2009; Bu¨schemann and Deutscher, 2011).
Jones and Ferguson (1988) and Cocco and Jones (1997) focus on the impact of the
location of a NHL team on team demand. Jones and Ferguson (1988) find a strong
relationship between locational attributes, i.e. the country in which the match takes
place (Canada vs. US), the population and income of inhabitants, and attendance.
Their results also indicate positive effects of fighting, the number of stars playing for the
respective teams, a team’s qualification for the playoffs, matches played at the weekend
and team standings on attendance. No effect is found for the uncertainty of a match.
The authors conclude that locational factors, league rules and team success significantly
influence the decision of fans to attend a match.
Cocco and Jones (1997) investigate the viability of Canadian small market franchises.
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They examine the relationship between team demand and locational factors as well as
team quality for Canadian NHL teams. Locational factors are captured by the population
and per capita income of the city a team is located in. The authors also control for the
teams’ rankings, match uncertainty, the relevance of a match for reaching the playoffs,
the day of a match (weekend) and the playing style of a team (fighting, skating or both).
Regression results show that population is negatively correlated with attendance while
income and team quality of both the home and away team positively affect attendance.
Winfree and Fort (2008) as well as Rascher et al. (2009) focus on the impact of the
NHL lockout 2004/05 on attendance of minor and junior hockey leagues respectively the
National Basketball Association (NBA). Both studies suggest that the NHL lockout has
a positive effect on attendance of the other leagues. Winfree and Fort (2008) find that
attendance of junior and minor league hockey teams increases by about 5% during the
lockout. However, the lockout variable is only significant for minor league teams. In
addition, the authors show that team quality significantly raises the league’s demand.
Rascher et al. (2009) focus on the impact of the NHL lockout on minor hockey leagues and
the NBA. The results indicate that the respective leagues exhibit a significant increase
in demand by about 2% during the lockout. Moreover regression results show that
team specific factors as well as team quality also attract fans, while population only is
significant and positive for the NBA.
7.1.3 Determining the Impact of Stars on Attendance
Although some of the above mentioned studies control for the presence of superstars, they
provide few insights into the importance of stars for the demand for sporting competi-
tions. The following describes several studies which explicitly focus on the relationship
between superstars and demand.
Hausman and Leonard (1997), for instance, test the effect of certain NBA super-
stars, namely Michael Jordan, Larry Bird, ‘Magic’ Johnson, Isiah Thomas and Shaquille
O’Neal, on television ratings and gate attendance. Depending on the chosen period
(1989/90 vs. 1991/92) results show a significant and positive effect of superstars on local
cable ratings, regardless of whether the stars play for the home or the visiting team.
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By analyzing data from TNT57, Hausman and Leonard (1997) find that the presence of
Magic Johnson has the greatest effect. His appearance raises TNT’s ratings by approx-
imately 38%. Another analysis is conducted with a dataset from NBC58. Estimation
results confirm the positive impact of superstars on demand. Relating to gate atten-
dance, Hausman and Leonard examine if away teams with a superstar in their squad
attract more fans than (visiting) teams without such a superstar. Results point to a
major influence of superstars on road attendance.
Berri et al. (2004) present different estimation models in order to analyze the effect of
superstars on fan interest in the NBA. The authors use information on gate revenue to
operationalize fan interest. Depending on the model, superstars have a significant and
positive or no effect at all on fan interest. They include distinct variables to control for
a superstar effect. On the one hand, they take a variable into account that refers to
a team’s overall star attraction. They measure this attraction by calculating the sum
of All-Star Game votes per team. On the other hand, they include dummy variables
for four superstars: Michael Jordan, Shaquille O’Neal, Grant Hill and Charles Barkley.
As control variables, Berri et al. use the team performance / quality, certain franchise
characteristics (stadium capacity and age, expansion team, roster stability) and mar-
ket characteristics (competitive balance, population, income). The authors estimate a
double-logged model as well as linear models to examine the relationship between the
different determinants and attendance. The effect of the star variables depends on the
model considered: the All-Star votes have significant and positive effect on gate revenue
in the double-logged model (which tends to be the more appropriate one) while they
are insignificant in the linear model. In contrast to the results of Hausman and Leo-
nard (1997), none of the four superstar players has a significant impact on gate revenue.
Closing, Berri et al. compare the effect of superstars with the impact of wins on gate
revenue. As gate revenue turns out to be more affected by wins and stadium capacity,
the authors conclude that “it is performance on the court, not star power, that attracts
the fans in the NBA” (Berri et al., 2004, p. 44).
57TNT (Turner Network Television) is an American TV channel.
58NBC is another US TV channel respectively a broadcast network with several radio and TV stations.
51
7 The Effect of Stars on Attendance
Based on Hausman and Leonard (1997), Berri and Schmidt (2006) examine the ex-
ternality of superstars on road attendance in the NBA. The authors extend the work of
Hausman and Leonard by using a larger data set (1992/93 - 1995/96) and identifying
a larger number of superstars. Similar to the study of 2004, Berri and Schmidt (2006)
rather focus on an aggregate measure of star power than individual star players. The
star attraction of a team is again captured by the sum of All-Star game votes of its
players. Control variables are the market size, the expansion status of a team, roster
stability, competitive balance and the racial composition of a team. Results show that
road attendance is significantly affected by team wins, star power and racial composi-
tion. Following this analysis, Berri and Schmidt also examine the effect of individual
star players on road attendance and to what extent this effect is based on a player’s star
appeal or his on-court productivity. Results suggest that productivity is more impor-
tant for road attendance than star appeal, confirming the results of the previous study
by Berri et al. (2004). Nevertheless, the authors conclude that stars attract fans and
generate revenue, especially when they play for the visiting team.
The most recent empirical study on the effect of superstars on attendance is conducted
by Brandes et al. (2008). In contrast to prior studies the authors do not use data from
the NBA but the major German soccer league ‘Bundesliga’. Brandes et al. distinguish
between “local heroes” and superstars and estimate their effect separately for home and
away attendance. Brandes et al. regard a superstar as a player whose market value
belongs to the league’s top 2% quantile. A local hero is defined as “the most valued
player of a particular team that has no superstars” (Brandes et al., 2008, p. 267).
The authors use several control variables to isolate the star and local hero effect from
other influences: team factors such as reputation (average ranking in the last 20 years)
and stadium capacity as well as market characteristics (male population, unemployment
rate and competitive balance). Fixed effects regressions show that superstars increase
attendance both at home and in away matches while local heroes only attract fans in
home matches.
So far, empirical research refers to superstars by using measures of popularity or
salary. The study at hand takes a different approach and makes use of the presence of
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NHL-players in minor hockey leagues, namely in the Czech Extraliga and the German
DEL. We regard NHL-players playing for European hockey clubs as star players and
analyze whether these stars affect attendance in the two leagues. We use various control
variables that have proven to be important determinants for demand in previous studies
(see section 7.3.3).
7.2 Professional Hockey in Germany and the Czech Republic
In the Czech Republic hockey and soccer are the most popular and successful sports
in terms of attracting attention from both the media and supporters. With respect to
hockey, Germany is somewhat different: Although the DEL is one of the more popular
leagues, it is ranked far behind the major soccer league (Bundesliga) and competes with
basketball and handball for the second place on the popularity scale. Total revenue of
the DEL was about 86 Million Euro in 2011/1259 or four percent of the Bundesliga’s
revenue in 2011/12 (2.08 Billion Euro)60.61
The Czech major hockey league ‘Extraliga’ was founded following the political breakup
of the Czechoslovakia in 1993. Its antecessor, the ‘Czechoslovak First Ice Hockey League’,
started in 1931. The Extraliga organized its inaugural championship season in 1993/94.
HC Kladno was the first team to win the Czech championship. A total of 22 different
teams have played in the Extraliga ever since. Only six clubs have been permanent
members of the league.62 In the initial two seasons only 12 teams competed for the
national championship. In 1995/96 the Extraliga expanded to 14 teams. VHK Vset´ın
won the most titles, namely six, but withdrew from competition due to financial problems
later on. Participation in the Extraliga is regulated by a promotion and relegation
system. Until 2012/13 the four teams at the bottom of the standings had to play a
relegation round with the loser playing a best-of-seven series against the winner of the
59www.handelsblatt.com/sport/sonstige-sportarten/handball-basketball-eishockey-profi-ligen-
kaempfen-um-den-silberrang/7369336.html
60www.bundesliga.de/de/liga/news/2012/dfl-stellt-bundesliga-report-2013-vor-bundesliga-bestaetigt-
nachhaltiges-wachstum 0000238084.php
61Data on total revenue of the Extraliga are not available.
62Litv´ınov, Pardubice, Plzen, Sparta Prag, Vı´tkovice and Zl´ın.
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First League. Since 2012/13 the two worst teams of the play-outs play against the
play-off winners of the First League.
In contrast to the Extraliga, the DEL is a closed league without a relegation system.
The DEL was established in 1994 following a period of financial distress for many hockey
clubs. Hence, the league organizers aimed at offering an attractive competition combined
with financial security of the clubs. In the inaugural season 1994/95, 18 teams parti-
cipated in the competition for the German championship. Ko¨lner Haie was the first
club that won the German championship. In the following seasons, the number of teams
varied between 18 and 14. Since 2010/11 there were only two changes in the field of
participants: In the year 2013 Hannover Scorpions sold their licence to Schwenninger
Wild Wings, and in 2016 Hamburg Freezers could not afford to pay the licence fee and
hence withdrew from the DEL. Fischtown Pinguins moved up and made their debut in
the season 2016/17. Apart from that, the same set of (14) teams competes in the DEL
since 2010/11. Overall 31 different teams have participated in the DEL. There are only
six teams which have been permanent members of the DEL.63 The most successful club
is Eisba¨ren Berlin, winning a total of seven titles.
Both the DEL and Extraliga seasons are divided into a regular and a postseason. In
the regular season, each of the 14 teams plays four times against each other team (twice
at each team’s arena), resulting in 52 matches per team and 364 matches per league and
season. In both leagues eight teams qualify for the postseason which consists of three
rounds (best-of-seven series). The top six teams of the regular season directly qualify
for the play-offs. The teams on rank seven to ten have to play a preliminary round.64
Both leagues restrict the number of foreign players that are allowed to play for a team.
Currently, each DEL team is allowed to contract nine foreign players65, while only six
foreign players per team are permitted in the Extraliga.
63Adler Mannheim, Ko¨lner Haie, Eisba¨ren Berlin, Ice Tigers Nu¨rnberg, Krefeld Pinguine, Augsburger
Panther
64In the Extraliga the preliminary round is played in a best-of-five series, in the DEL in a best-of-three
series.
65Prior to the 2012/13 season ten foreign players were allowed to play for a given team of the DEL
(www.welt.de/sport/article12541845/DEL-senkt-Auslaenderquote-in-der-kommenden-Saison.html).
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7.3 Data Description and Empirical Approach
The dataset at hand covers information on all DEL and Extraliga matches of the regular
seasons 2011/12 and 2012/13.66 Overall we have information on 728 matches per league.
However, we exclude 18 matches because of certain peculiarities or missing data: First,
we exclude five matches as they are hosted in unusual settings. These refer to two
DEL and three Extraliga matches. The ‘DEL winter game’ 2011/12 took place in a
soccer stadium and in front of 50,000 spectators. The match EHC Mu¨nchen against
Augsburger Panther was relocated to another arena in Munich. In 2012/13 three home
games by Ryt´ı˜ri Kladno were held at an arena in Prague.67 These games and venues
exhibit particular features for which we cannot control and hence, they are not included
in our analysis. Another observation has to be excluded because information on betting
odds is missing.68 As we control for the rank of the teams prior to a match, we also have
to exclude all matches played on the first matchday as no rank prior to the first match
of a season is available. The final dataset comprises 710 matches per league.69
Data stems from a variety of sources. Game related data derives from the leagues’
official websites www.del.org and www.hokej.cz as well as from the hockey website
www.hockeydb.com. The dataset includes information on the teams, the day and time
of the match, the number of spectators and the respective region and arena. Infor-
mation on further influencing factors, such as the number of inhabitants and unem-
ployment rates stems from the websites of the Federal Employment Agency of Germany
(www.statistik.arbeitsagentur.de), the German Federal Statistical Office (www.destatis.de),
the Czech Statistical Office (www.czso.cz) and the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech
Republic (www.mvcr.cz/mvcren).
66Play-off matches are not considered in our analysis since all NHL-players left the DEL and Extraliga
prior to the play-offs. Hence, we cannot compare play-off matches with stars with play-off matches
without them. As play-off matches usually attract more fans than regular season matches, including
these games would distort the results.
67Against Pardubice, Brno and Slavia Prag.
68Vitkovice HC - Mlada Boleslav, October 9th, 2011
69356 observations per league relate to the season 2011/12 and 354 to the season 2012/13.
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7.3.1 Descriptive Statistics - Attendance Overall
Villar and Guerrero describe several possibilities to define the demand for sporting con-
tests. While some studies use the number of tickets or the proportion of tickets sold,
others refer to the number of unsold seats or the ratio of attendance and capacity. In
the subsequent analysis we apply the attendance/capacity-ratio as our dependent varia-
ble. Welki and Zlatoper (1999) prefer to use a proportion over the absolute number of
spectators because it adjusts for varying stadium capacities. “The larger the stadium
capacity, the greater the number attending if the inclination to attend is equal across
ticketholders in the various cities” (Welki and Zlatoper, 1999, p. 287). Considering the
attendance/capacity-ratio helps to avoid this issue.
Variable League Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
attendance DEL 710 6,022.88 3,662.21 1503 18,500
Extraliga 710 4,948.08 1,899.08 1801 14,175
attendance/capacity-ratio DEL 710 0.641 0.217 0.187 1
Extraliga 710 0.629 0.216 0.131 1
Tab. 7.1 Descriptive Statistics of Attendance and the Ratio of Attendance
and Capacity
Table 7.1 shows that hockey matches attract on average 6,000 spectators in Germany
and 5,000 in the Czech Republic in the seasons 2011/12 and 2012/13. The majority of
matches of the DEL and Extraliga are not sold out: in only about 15% of the matches the
attendance/capacity-ratio is above 90% (see Figure 7.1). This eases the interpretation of
the results as a high number of sold out matches would raise the question of how many
tickets could have been sold given a larger arena.
The standard deviation of attendance in the DEL is twice as large as in the Extraliga.
This is not surprising as the German teams are located in cities that differ considerably
with reference to inhabitants. The differences between the Czech cities are considerably
smaller than those between the German cities. There are teams from Germany’s largest
cities, namely Berlin, Hamburg and Munich, with more than a million inhabitants as
well as teams from rather small cities, such as Villingen-Schwenningen, Straubing or
Iserlohn, with less than 100,000 inhabitants (see also Table 7.7). Figure 7.1 reports
the distribution of the attendance/capacity-ratio for both leagues. As some matches are
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sold out, the data is slightly right censored. Hence, we estimate the impact of stars on
attendance by applying Tobit regression models later on.
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Fig. 7.1 Distribution of attendance/capacity-ratio per League
Further statistics on a team-level show that the average number of spectators depends
on the individual club (see Figure 7.2). Eisba¨ren Berlin is the most popular club in
the DEL with an average attendance of 14,000 spectators. The majority of matches of
Eisba¨ren Berlin is sold out, the average attendance/capacity-ratio is 98%. Nine German
clubs attract on average less than 5,000 spectators.
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Fig. 7.2 Average Attendance and attendance/capacity-ratio per Club
In the Extraliga, the most popular club is Pardubice with on average about 8,500
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spectators. Overall, the Czech clubs seem to be more homogenous regarding attendance,
although the attendance/capacity-ratio varies almost as much as in the DEL.
7.3.2 Descriptive Statistics - NHL-Players and Attendance
Overall, 40 NHL-players signed (temporary) contracts with Czech or German hockey
clubs. 28 players decided to play in the Extraliga and twelve in the DEL (see Table 7.2).
DEL Extraliga
NHL- NHL-
Players Players
Hannover 1 Slavia Praha 1
Du¨sseldorf 0 Kladno 5
Nu¨rnberg 0 Sparta Praha 1
Wolfsburg 0 Vitkovice 2
Mu¨nchen 2 Karlovy Vary 1
Krefeld 1 Liberec 4
Ko¨ln 0 Litvinov 0
Augsburg 0 Zlin 0
Hamburg 1 Ceske Budejovice 5
Mannheim 4 Trinec 2
Ingolstadt 0 Plzen 1
Iserlohn 1 Chomutov 3
Straubing 0 Pardubice 3
Berlin 2 Brno 0
Total 12 Total 28
Tab. 7.2 Number of NHL-Players per Team and League
We have information on the identity of each of these players, the date of arrival and
departure, their nationality and the number of all-star games these players appeared in
as well as information on the clubs they previously have played for. The NHL-players
are distributed over seven German and eleven Czech teams. While the DEL team Adler
Mannheim contracted a maximum of four NHL-players, seven German teams forwent
signing a NHL-player. The Extraliga clubs Kladno and Ceske Budejovice70 even signed
five NHL-players. The majority of Czech clubs engaged at least one NHL-player, contrary
to German teams.71
70Ceske Budejovice signed five different NHL-players, but only four were with the team at the same
time. One player (Martinek Radek) had already left the team after a few days.
71The player’s names are shown in Table A in the appendix.
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DEL Extraliga
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent
NHLhome 0 633 89.15 560 78.87
1 77 10.85 150 21.13
Total 710 100 710 100
NHLaway 0 629 88.59 554 78.03
1 81 11.41 156 21.97
Total 710 100 710 100
NHLoverall 0 579 81.55 506 71.27
1 131 18.45 204 28.73
Total 710 100 710 100
Tab. 7.3 Number of Matches with at least one NHL-Player
There are 131 (204) matches in the DEL (Extraliga) in which at least one NHL-player
belongs to either the squad of the home or the away team (see NHLoverall in Table 7.3).
72
All of these matches relate to the season 2012/13 in which the NHL-lockout took place,
i.e. we can observe at least one ‘star’ in 37% (57%) of all regular season matches of the
DEL (Extraliga) in 2012/13. There are only 18 DEL matches in which more than two
NHL-players are on the field (Table 7.4). In the Extraliga, the total number of NHL-
players is considerably larger. There is even a match in which eight NHL-players can be
observed.
DEL Extraliga
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
Total Number of 0 579 81.55 81.55 506 71.27 71.27
NHL-players 1 71 10 91.55 63 8.87 80.14
2 42 5.92 97.46 48 6.76 86.9
3 12 1.69 99.15 29 4.08 90.99
4 1 0.14 99.3 24 3.38 94.37
5 5 0.7 100 23 3.24 97.61
6 0 0 100 9 1.27 98.87
7 0 0 100 7 0.99 99.86
8 0 0 100 1 0.14 100
Total 710 100 710 100
Tab. 7.4 Total Number of NHL-Players per Match
Most of the players from the NHL returned to their home country during the lockout.
72NHLhome (NHLaway) is a dummy variable that indicates if at least one NHL-player belongs to the
home (away) team.
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Table 7.5 provides respective information on the nationalities of the NHL-players. Be-
cause of the restriction on the number of foreign players in both leagues and the insecurity
about the length of the lockout, most clubs only contracted native NHL-players. Half
of the NHL-players playing in the DEL were German, in the Extraliga even 75% of the
NHL-players were Czech.
DEL Extraliga
Nation Freq. Percent Cum. Nation Freq. Percent Cum.
CAN 3 25.00 25.00 CAN 5 17.86 17.86
GER 6 50.00 75.00 CZE 21 75.00 92.86
US 1 8.33 83.33 FIN 1 3.57 96.43
US CAN 2 16.67 100 SK 1 3.57 100
Total 12 100 Total 28 100
Tab. 7.5 Nationality of NHL-Players
Table 7.6 reports descriptive statistics of further characteristics of the NHL-players.
In Germany every third NHL-player already had played for the respective team in the
DEL, in the Extraliga almost half of the NHL-players went back to a club they have
played for in the past (teamexperience). The previous stint with the team was usually
at the beginning of the players’ careers and prior to their first NHL experience. It seems
that players preferred to play in a known setting rather than in an unknown city.
Variable League Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
teamexperience (dummy) DEL 12 0.33 0.49 0 1
Extraliga 28 0.46 0.51 0 1
matches played in 2012/13 DEL 12 16.33 8.02 6 32
Extraliga 28 19.14 8.80 4 34
age DEL 12 28.84 3.73 23.18 35.25
Extraliga 28 29.08 4.81 24.07 40.60
All Star (dummy) DEL 12 0.33 0.49 0 1
Extraliga 28 0.14 0.36 0 1
years played in NHL DEL 12 7.67 3.87 3 15
Extraliga 28 8.29 4.35 3 19
matches played in NHL DEL 12 422.75 244.96 38 813
Extraliga 28 470.32 299.27 102 1346
draft pick DEL 12 67.67 51.05 5 172
Extraliga 28 83.93 80.60 4 241
Tab. 7.6 Descriptive Statistics of NHL-Player Characteristics
The NHL-players played on average 16 matches for DEL clubs and 19 games for
Extraliga teams during the NHL lockout. Some players even stayed for more than 30
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matches.73 The players were on average 29 years old and most of them had not played
an All-Star game prior to their engagement in the DEL or Extraliga. Only four players
in both the DEL and Extraliga already had experienced an All-Star game. Most of the
NHL-players who signed a contract with a German or Czech club previously had played
several years in the NHL. 15 players were selected in the first round of the annual NHL
draft. Rostislav Klesla (pick number 4), Jaromir Jagr (5) and Blake Wheeler (5) were
among the first to be selected. Klesla (Trinec) and Jagr (Kladno) played for Czech teams,
Wheeler (Mu¨nchen) for a German one.
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Fig. 7.3 attendance/capacity-ratio of Teams with and without NHL-Player
Figure 7.3 compares the attendance/capacity-ratio of matches with and without NHL-
players for the respective teams. Surprisingly, the attendance of DEL matches with
NHL-players is lower than without NHL-players. When we consider attendance per
DEL club, there are only marginal differences between matches with and without NHL-
players, except for the team from Hamburg. On average 8,700 fans attended a match of
the Hamburg Freezers in 2011/12 and 2012/13, but only about 6,900 spectators attended
a match after the club contracted the Canadian NHL-player Jamie Benn. In general, the
73Jaromir Jagr (Kladno) and Vladimir Sobotka (Slavia Praha) stayed the longest in the Czech Republic,
namely 111 days. Christian Ehrhoff (Krefeld) stayed for the longest period in Germany (105 days).
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average attendance of Hamburg decreased from 9,200 in 2011/12 to 7,700 in 2012/13.
Among other things, this could be due to free tickets that had been given away in an
attempt to increase tickets in 2011/12.74 If we exclude Hamburg from the comparison,
there are slightly more spectators at matches with NHL-players than without. Most of
the Czech clubs that signed a NHL-player could increase attendance figures, especially
Kladno: Kladno almost doubled its attendance/capacity-ratio after several NHL-players
joined the team.75 Overall, matches with NHL-players could attract slightly more spec-
tators than matches without NHL-players in the Extraliga, even when we exclude Kladno
from the analysis.
7.3.3 Control Variables
Besides the appearance of star players, further factors affect demand and therefore need
to be controlled for. Borland and MacDonald (2003) point out that consumer prefe-
rences, economic aspects, the quality of viewing, characteristics of the sporting contest
and the supply capacity are important determinants of attendance (see section 7.1.1).
Hence, we control for most of these determinants. We assume that consumer preferen-
ces such as loyalty and habit depend on the respective team and are constant over the
two considered seasons. Therefore we control for these factors by including team fixed
effects in some of the models. Concerning economic aspects, we make use of data on the
market size, measured by the number of inhabitants (inhabitants), the unemployment
rate of the respective cities (unemployment) and the availability of substitutes, measured
by the distance between a given team and the nearest other first division hockey team
(distancehockey). Ticket prices are unavailable for both leagues.76 Table 7.7 reports des-
criptive statistics on these variables as well as on further control variables. The German
clubs are located in larger cities than the Czech teams. The number of inhabitants is
74www.taz.de/!107131/
75This could be due to the fact that Jaromir Jagr, the most popular hockey player in the Czech Republic,
was amongst the NHL-players who joined Kladno’s team.
76Even in case data on prices were available, it would be problematic to include prices into the analysis.
Empirical analysis of the impact of ticket prices on attendance often lacks meaningful results because
it is not obvious how to deal with the different categories of tickets and prices (Villar and Guerrero,
2009).
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almost twice as high. The unemployment rates of the clubs’ cities range between 3.3%
(Ingolstadt) and 16% (Litvinov). On average the unemployment rate is higher in Czech
than in German cities. As the area of the Czech Republic is smaller than the area of
Germany the distances between hockey opponents are shorter for Czech hockey teams.
An important factor for the quality of viewing at a sporting event is the age and
the modernity of an arena. In order to control for this kind of quality, we collected
data on the age of an arena (arenaage) and the year of the most recent renovation
(arenarenovation). Table 7.7 shows that Czech arenas are almost twice as old as the
arenas in Germany. Furthermore, Czech arenas are modernized less often than German
ones. The quality of viewing also depends on the atmosphere of an arena. An arena
exclusively build for hockey is expected to have a better atmosphere than multifunctional
arenas. In the Extraliga, 10 out of 15 arenas are multifunctional while 9 out of 14 arenas
are multifunctional in Germany. We control for the different kinds of arenas by including
a dummy variable that indicates if an arena is multifunctional or not (multifunctional).
Variable League Level Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
inhabitants (Mio) DEL team 14 0.74 0.93 0.05 3.44
Extraliga team 15 0.26 0.41 0.03 1.24
unemployment DEL team 14 7.05 2.35 3.3 11.95
Extraliga team 15 8.60 3.57 4.24 15.80
distancehockey DEL team 14 94.00 55.27 27 240
Extraliga team 15 62.57 39.38 1 135
arenaage DEL team 14 20.35 9.87 12.58 44.84
Extraliga team 15 39.32 11.39 21.15 51.71
arenarenovation DEL team 14 6.69 2.56 3.22 12.45
Extraliga team 15 11.06 5.64 6.73 26.17
multifunctional DEL team 14 0.64 0.50 0 1
Extraliga team 15 0.67 0.49 0 1
6pm (dummy) DEL match 710 0.64 0.48 0 1
Extraliga match 710 0.58 0.49 0 1
Christmas (dummy) DEL match 710 0.03 0.16 0 1
Extraliga match 710 0.02 0.15 0 1
distance DEL match 710 408.22 199.94 27 791
Extraliga match 710 237.55 138.79 1 530
heterogeneity DEL match 710 0.12 0.15 -0.30 0.55
Extraliga match 710 0.14 0.15 -0.30 0.52
capacity DEL match 710 9468.74 4236.63 4500 18500
Extraliga match 710 8401.41 3206.06 4200 17000
Tab. 7.7 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables
The time and day of a match is another important factor influencing the quality of
viewing. Most of the games of both leagues take place on either Friday or Sunday (see
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Table 7.8). Because of the high share of these days we include a dummy variable that
indicates whether a match takes place on one of these main days or not (mainday). The
majority of games starts after 5pm except for Sunday games of the DEL. Here, more
than 30% start at 2.30pm and more than 50% at 4.30pm. We assume that games that
start in the evening attract a larger crowd than matches that started earlier in the day.
Hence, we control for matches that starts at or after 6pm (6pm). Finally, we also control
for holidays. As several studies find that attendance is higher when matches are played
on holidays (Borland and MacDonald, 2003, p. 488; Villar and Guerrero, 2009, p. 146)
we include a respective variable (Christmas). Christmas indicates if a match is played
between December 23rd and January 2nd, the usual time frame for Christmas holidays.
About 2 to 3 percent of the matches are played during Christmas holidays.
DEL Extraliga
Freq. Percent Cum. Freq. Percent Cum.
Monday 13 1.83 1.83 11 1.55 1.55
Tuesday 79 11.13 12.96 128 18.03 19.58
Wednesday 23 3.24 16.2 64 9.01 28.59
Thursday 6 0.85 17.04 37 5.21 33.8
Friday 299 42.11 59.15 222 31.27 65.07
Saturday 6 0.85 60 2 0.28 65.35
Sunday 284 40 100 246 34.65 100
Total 710 100 710 100
Tab. 7.8 Weekdays of matches
Characteristics of the sporting contest refer, among others, to the quality and signifi-
cance of a match as well as to the uncertainty of outcome. The quality of a match can be
proxied by the sum of abilities of the respective teams. In the subsequent analysis, the
teams’ skills are represented by the ranking of the teams prior to the respective match
(rank). Rivalry has been shown to impact attendance as well. The rivalry between two
teams mostly refers to geographical closeness of the teams. Hence, we include the variable
distance that measures the distance in kilometers between the home and away team.77
The distance between the two cities can also be considered as an economic factor: the
longer the distance, the higher the travel costs for fans of the away team. Therefore we
expect a negative impact of distance on attendance. In addition, we include the match
77We calculated the differences between the cities by using Google Maps.
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day and its squared value into our analysis (matchday, matchday2) since we expect that
the importance or attractiveness of games varies over the course of a season.78 Another
characteristic of a sporting contest relates to the uncertainty of outcome. Fans might
be more interested in ‘uncertain’ matches than in matches that seem to be decided in
advance (see e.g. Rottenberg, 2000; Zimbalist, 2002). We measure the uncertainty of out-
come as the difference between the home team’s and away team’s winning probabilities
(heterogeneity). We calculate winning probabilities by means of betting odds that stem
from the website www.betexplorer.com. Table 7.7 shows that matches of the Extraliga
seem to be slightly less balanced than games of the DEL (0.14 vs. 0.12).
Finally, Borland and MacDonald (2003) declare that the capacity of an arena is an
important factor for the demand of sporting contests. Therefore we also control for the
capacity of an arena (capacity). The German arenas have a slightly higher capacity than
the ones in the Czech Republic. The German arenas hold on average more than 9,500
spectators, while the Czech arenas have an average capacity of about 8,500.
7.4 Empirical Analysis
As there are teams with up to five NHL-players at the same time, we use two different
variables to test the impact of ‘stars’ on attendance: First, we use a dummy variable
that indicates if there is at least one NHL-player in the home respectively away team
(NHLhome/NHLaway). Second, we control for the number of NHL-Players of the home re-
spectively away team (Number NHLhome/Number NHLaway). For each league we estimate
regressions with both alternatives. As explained above, the attendance/capacity-ratio of
a match by home team i against away team j at matchday t is our dependent variable.
As this ratio is right censored we estimate Tobit models in the subsequent analysis. For
each league we estimate Tobit models of the following basic form:
78We assume that matches at the begin and the end of a season attract more fans than matches in
the middle of an ongoing season. Hockey fans often long for the start of the season as they have
to do without during summer. Hence, the demand for hockey matches should be higher in the first
matches of a season. Whether a team achieves to qualify for the postseason often is decided in
the last matches of the regular season. Therefore, matches at the end of the season often are more
important and attractive respectively.
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att./cap.− ratioijt = β0 + β1 ·NHLi + β2 ·NHLj + β3 · inhabitantsi + β4 · unemploymenti
+ β5 · distancehockeyi + β6 · arenarenovationi + β7 · arenarenovation2i
+ β8 ·multifunctionali + β9 ·maindayijt + β10 · 6pmijt + β11 · Christmasijt
+ β12 · ranki + β13 · rankj + β14 · distanceij + β15 · heterogeneityijt
+ β16 ·matchdayijt + β17 ·matchday2ijt + β17 · capacityi + ijt
Furthermore, we run estimations without team- and time-constant variables but home
and away team fixed effects. Tables 7.9 and 7.10 show the results of the presence and
the number of NHL-players on attendance in matches of the DEL (Model 1 and 2, 5 and
6) and the Extraliga (Model 3 and 4, 7 and 8).
Results illustrate that the impact of stars on attendance depends on the league and
the model specification. Model 1 and 2 indicate that stars do not affect attendance in
the DEL, neither if a star is playing for the home nor the away team. In contrast to the
DEL, the presence of stars increases fan interest significantly in the Extraliga (Model
3 and 4). However, if we do not include home and away team fixed effects, stars only
attract more Czech fans if they play for the away team (Model 3). Once team fixed
effects are included stars of both home and away team increase attendance significantly.
The coefficient of NHLhome is considerably larger than the coefficient of NHLaway (0.05
vs. 0.03). Stars on a home team’s roster raise the demand for hockey matches by more
than 5%, i.e. a home team can increase attendance by about 420 spectators per match
when they sign a star player.
We obtain similar results when we replace the dummy variables NHLhome and NHLaway
by the number of NHL-players that play for the home respectively away team (Number
NHLhome, Number NHLaway). Table 7.10 confirms that the star effect depends on the
considered league and model. Again, star effects are negligible for the German DEL.
The star variable is only significant in Model 5, i.e. when we exclude home and away
team fixed effects. In case we control for time-invariant team effects, results show that
German hockey fans do not react to the presence of NHL-players.
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DEL Extraliga
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
NHLhome 0.0311 0.0065 0.0096 0.0520***
(0.0231) (0.0158) (0.0219) (0.0157)
NHLaway 0.0031 0.0076 0.0717*** 0.0330**
(0.0215) (0.0152) (0.0216) (0.0162)
inhabitants 0.1199*** 0.2368***
(0.0110) (0.0443)
unemployment 0.0018 0.0061**
(0.0050) (0.0029)
distancehockey 0.0006*** 0.0023***
(0.0001) (0.0003)
arenarenovation -0.0081* -0.0104 -0.0093*** 0.0103
(0.0043) (0.0191) (0.0029) (0.0160)
arenarenovation2 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0004)
multifunctional -0.0672*** 0.0388**
(0.0210) (0.0183)
rankhome -0.0117*** -0.0037*** -0.0048*** -0.0052***
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007)
rankaway -0.0037*** -0.0011 -0.0035*** -0.0022***
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007)
distance -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0004*** -0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
heterogeneity 0.0653 0.0293 0.1220** 0.0110
(0.0814) (0.0664) (0.0612) (0.0542)
Christmas 0.1394*** 0.1368*** 0.0730* 0.0838***
(0.0398) (0.0263) (0.0413) (0.0281)
mainday 0.0775*** 0.0649*** 0.0682*** 0.0650***
(0.0162) (0.0107) (0.0132) (0.0091)
6pm 0.0136 -0.0130 0.0107 -0.0265***
(0.0130) (0.0087) (0.0139) (0.0099)
matchday -0.0008 0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0015
(0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0012)
matchday2 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
capacity -0.0139*** -0.0474***
(0.0025) (0.0044)
season2012 -0.0105 -0.0130 -0.0115 -0.0231
(0.0138) (0.0134) (0.0175) (0.0143)
Constant 0.9187*** 0.8714*** 0.9208*** 0.8573***
(0.0533) (0.0962) (0.0579) (0.0427)
hometeam dummies No Yes No Yes
awayteam dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 710 710 710 710
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.551 0.806 0.502 0.779
- dependent variable: attendance/capacity-ratio
- Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Tab. 7.9 Tobit Results for NHLhome / NHLaway
Similar to the previous estimation, demand of Czech fans significantly increases once
stars play for the competing teams. In contrast to Model 4, Model 8 suggests that
the presence of stars has a stronger effect when they play for the away teams. The
more stars belong to the teams’ squads the more Czech fans can be attracted. Overall,
analysis shows that stars have no universal effect on demand. While star players attract
significantly more spectators in the Czech league, German hockey teams hardly benefit
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from such players. Underlying conditions tend to affect the impact of stars and hence,
have to be taken into account.
DEL Extraliga
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Number NHLhome 0.0309** 0.0142 0.0109 0.0276***
(0.0142) (0.0097) (0.0085) (0.0063)
Number NHLaway 0.0063 0.0092 0.0540*** 0.0465***
(0.0140) (0.0099) (0.0085) (0.0067)
inhabitants 0.1211*** 0.2394***
(0.0110) (0.0438)
unemployment 0.0015 0.0066**
(0.0050) (0.0029)
distancehockey 0.0005*** 0.0023***
(0.0001) (0.0003)
arenarenovation -0.0079* -0.0069 -0.0105*** 0.0044
(0.0043) (0.0190) (0.0028) (0.0152)
arenarenovation2 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002*** -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0003)
multifunctional -0.0675*** 0.0345*
(0.0208) (0.0177)
rankhome -0.0117*** -0.0037*** -0.0046*** -0.0050***
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007)
rankaway -0.0034*** -0.0010 -0.0043*** -0.0031***
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007)
distance -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
heterogeneity 0.0535 0.0273 0.1818*** 0.0878
(0.0822) (0.0664) (0.0631) (0.0602)
Christmas 0.1408*** 0.1361*** 0.0912** 0.1034***
(0.0396) (0.0262) (0.0404) (0.0267)
mainday 0.0773*** 0.0649*** 0.0676*** 0.0624***
(0.0161) (0.0107) (0.0129) (0.0086)
6pm 0.0136 -0.0131 0.0114 -0.0269***
(0.0130) (0.0087) (0.0136) (0.0094)
matchday -0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0026 -0.0029**
(0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0012)
matchday2 0.0001** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0001***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
capacity -0.0140*** -0.0469***
(0.0024) (0.0043)
season2012 -0.0142 -0.0188 -0.0284* -0.0425***
(0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0160) (0.0127)
Constant 0.9284*** 0.8474*** 0.9233*** 0.8744***
(0.0534) (0.0961) (0.0567) (0.0406)
hometeam dummies No Yes No Yes
awayteam dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 710 710 710 710
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.553 0.806 0.526 0.802
- dependent variable: attendance/capacity-ratio
- Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Tab. 7.10 Tobit Results for Number NHLhome / Number NHLaway
Several control variables also have a significant effect on the dependent variable. Simi-
lar to the NHL variables, the impact of the controls depend on the model specification,
e.g. arenarenovation is significant negative and arenarenovation2 significant positive in
Model 3, but insignificant in Model 4. Including team fixed effects tend to reduce the
68
7 The Effect of Stars on Attendance
significance of the (time-varying) explanatory variables while the proportion of explained
variance increases. This suggests that team specific effects account for a major part of
demand for hockey matches.
In almost all models the coefficients of mainday, distance and Christmas are highly
significant. The demand for hockey significantly increases, when a match takes place on
a Friday or Sunday and especially during (Christmas) holidays. The greater the distance
between the competing teams, the fewer spectators attend a match since the degree of
rivalry decreases and travel costs for the fans of the away team increase.
In Germany fans prefer ice hockey arenas to multifunctional arenas: The dummy vari-
able multifunctional is significant and negative (Model 1 and 5). In the Czech Republic it
is the other way round: multifunctional is significant and positive. Models without team
dummies show further differences between the DEL and Extraliga: The unemployment
rate in Germany is insignificant while it is significant and positive in the Czech Republic.
Existing literature argues that unemployment can have both a positive and negative ef-
fect on attendance. Some authors assume that unemployment is negatively related to
attendance, because less people can afford to buy tickets with increasing unemployment.
Other authors share the opinion that unemployment can have a positive effect on atten-
dance as sports can help people to “manage personal frustrations” (Villar and Guerrero,
2009, p. 135). The results confirm both positions.
Similar effects for DEL and Extraliga matches are shown for the number of inhabitants
and the teams’ ranks on attendance: The more inhabitants live in the respective cities,
the more spectators attend to a match. The rank of the home and away team prior to a
match has a negative and significant impact on attendance. Hence, the assumption that
the quality of the two teams is an important determinant of attendance is confirmed.
7.5 Conclusion
In contrast to previous studies on the impact of stars on attendance, we do not focus on
players who stay in the league for an entire season but players who come and go over the
course of a season. We make use of the NHL lockout in 2012/13 and analyze whether the
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appearance of NHL-players affect attendance in other hockey leagues, namely the Czech
Extraliga and the German DEL. Results show that stars attract significantly more fans
in the Czech Extraliga while the impact of stars mostly is insignificant in the German
DEL.
At first sight the differences between the leagues are difficult to explain. However, at
second glance there is some reasoning behind the results: First, hockey is of conside-
rably higher significance in the Czech Republic than it is in Germany. While average
attendance of Extraliga games is comparable to that of DEL matches, the number of Ger-
man inhabitants is more than seven times higher than the number of Czech inhabitants.
Therefore it can be assumed that hockey awareness is substantial higher in the Czech
Republic. Second, the NHL is considerably more popular in the Czech Republic than in
Germany as a high share of Czech hockey players is active in the NHL.79 Furthermore,
the Czech national hockey team is quite successful while the German team is rather
unsuccessful.80 International success of a national team is an important determinant for
attracting interest for the respective sport in the public. Hence, there is substantially
greater attention to hockey in the Czech Republic than in Germany. In consideration
of these two facts the results are not surprising. Concluding, the results suggest that
the presence of popular players only leads to an increase in attendance if the respective
sport is popular in the relevant country. In the Extraliga, more fans were attracted and
hence, more tickets could be sold. It can be assumed that Czech clubs could benefit eco-
nomically from the star players. On the contrary, we suggest that signing NHL-players
did not pay off for German clubs. German teams had to pay high insurance fees while
they could not increase fan interest.
Future research could replicate our analysis with data from other leagues, e.g. the
Russian or Swedish league. In these countries hockey is of high importance. Hence,
we expect that NHL-players could also increase attendance significantly, similar to the
79So far, a total of 220 Czech players - six times as many as German hockey players (37) - have been
playing in the NHL ever since. www.quanthockey.com/nhl/nationality-totals/nhl-players-career-
stats.html
80The Czech Republic respectively Czechoslovakia has won 10 Olympic medals until today. Germany
could win a medal only once. While the Czech Republic could celebrate their most recent Olympic
medal in 2012, the Germans are waiting for the next hockey medal since 1953.
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Extraliga. It also would be interesting to examine whether such star effects depend on
the considered sport. However, as lockouts in other leagues, e.g. in the NBA or NFL,
rarely cause players to play in other leagues such comparisons seem to be difficult.
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7.6 Appendix
Extraliga DEL
Player Team Player Team
1 Polak, Roman Vitkovice HC 1 Seidenberg, Dennis Adler Mannheim
2 Kuba, Filip Vitkovice HC 2 Goc, Marcel Adler Mannheim
3 Klesla, Rostislav Trinec Ocelari HC 3 Pominville, Jason Adler Mannheim
4 Hudler, Jiri Trinec Ocelari HC 4 Hecht, Jochen Adler Mannheim
5 Neuvirth, Michal Sparta Praha 5 Wheeler, Blake EHC Red Bull Mu¨nchen
6 Sobotka, Vladimir Slavia Praha HC 6 Stastny, Paul EHC Red Bull Mu¨nchen
7 Rask, Tuukka Plzen HC 7 Giroux, Claude Eisba¨ren Berlin
8 Kindl, Jakub Pardubice HC 8 Briere, Daniel Eisba¨ren Berlin
9 Hemsky, Ales Pardubice HC 9 Sulzer, Alexander ERC Ingolstadt
10 Krejci, David Pardubice HC 10 Benn, Jamie Hamburg Freezers
11 Pavelec, Ondrej Liberec Bili Tygri HC 11 Greiss, Thomas Hannover Scorpions
12 Smid, Ladislav Liberec Bili Tygri HC 12 Ehrhoff, Christian Krefeld Pinguine
13 Simmonds, Wayne Liberec Bili Tygri HC
14 Stewart, Chris Liberec Bili Tygri HC
15 Jagr, Jaromir Kladno
16 Plekanec, Tomas Kladno
17 Zidlicky, Marek Kladno
18 Tlusty, Jiri Kladno
19 Kaberle, Tomas Kladno
20 MacDonald, Andrew Karlovy Vary HC
21 Frolik, Michael Chomutov Pirati
22 Jurcina, Milan Chomutov Pirati
23 Chimera, Jason Chomutov Pirati
24 Radek, Martinek Ceske Budejovice HC
25 Ference, Andrew Ceske Budejovice HC
26 Hanzal, Martin Ceske Budejovice HC
27 Michalek, Milan Ceske Budejovice HC
28 Prospal, Vaclav Ceske Budejovice HC
Tab. 7.11 Name and Team of NHL-Players Playing in the Extraliga or
DEL
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The present work empirically analyzes different aspects of economic theory: The first part
concentrates on distinct implications drawn from tournament theory. First, the research
focuses on tournaments and their effect on effort, sabotage and risk-taking. Overall,
the results indicate that the availability of intermediate information significantly affects
contestants’ behavior. Effort, the willingness to sabotage the opponent as well as risk-
taking are adjusted to interim results. In contrast to information on within-tournament
asymmetry, ex-ante heterogeneity has proven to be insignificant (except for the case of
sabotage). With reference to effort (chapter 2), we make use of extensive performance
statistics recently available for players of the German Bundesliga. In a new approach
we relate effort to running data such as the distance run or the number of sprints and
intensive runs performed by an individual player per match. The results indicate that
effort is greatest when a player’s team leads by one goal. As players weigh potential
losses more than gains these results are in line with the concept of loss aversion. In
case intermediate information points at an increasing within-contest asymmetry, effort
of both participating teams decline.
In order to test whether agents’ willingness to sabotage depends on interim information
(chapter 3), we also rely on soccer data on team-level. Teams tend to be more prone to
engage in sabotage when they are slightly behind (by one goal) or the ex-ante underdogs.
While favorites sabotage most when they trail by one goal, underdogs show most of
their destructive activities when slightly ahead (by one goal). The least sabotage is to
be observed when the (absolute) goal difference equals three or more goals. Further
estimations indicate that engaging in sabotage has no or even negative effect on the
match-outcome, especially for favorites.
Chapter 4 focuses on agent’s risk strategy and its impact on performance. The ana-
lysis refers to coaches and their substitution strategy and exploits data from the UEFA
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Champions League. Depending on the tactical position of the outgoing and incoming
player, a substitution is assessed as risk-increasing or -reducing. Empirical results show
that coaches adjust their risk strategy to the current score of a match: lagging conte-
stants tend to increase risk in the course of a match while leading agents change to a
safer strategy. Further tests suggest that favorites and underdogs react differently to
within-match information: While underdogs reduce risk by larger amounts than favori-
tes when in the lead, favorites increase risk by larger amounts when behind with two or
more goals. Similar to sabotage, the chosen risk strategy does not affect the outcome of
a match.
Second, we test Ho¨ﬄer and Sliwka’s theoretical implication that managerial changes
can generate new incentives in case the respective agents are rather homogeneous (chap-
ter 5). The theoretical model by Ho¨ﬄer and Sliwka (2003) is based on tournament
theory’s assumption that asymmetric contests provide weak incentive effects to exert
effort. By using a large data set on the German Bundesliga, we can analyze whether
the team composition prior to a within-season dismissal affects its performance under a
new manager. Results indicate that the team composition is an important factor for the
success of a managerial change: homogeneous teams perform significantly better than
heterogeneous teams following a dismissal.
The second part of the thesis deals with another important factor influencing orga-
nizational performance: the individual at the top of the organization (chapter 6). By
means of an extensive dataset on the German Bundesliga and in an innovative approach
we examine the impact of individual coaches on the performance of their teams. The
soccer industry is well-suited for this kind of analysis. Since managerial changes occur
very frequently within an ongoing season, it is possible to separate the managerial effect
from team influences and other aspects. Results indicate that coaches have a significant
impact on team performance. We illustrate that there is a considerable variation bet-
ween coaches contributions. Furthermore, our analysis shows that managers also affect
team’s style of playing and that once famous and successful players do not necessarily
make good managers.
Finally, the perspective changes from the inside of an organization to the outside.
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From a market perspective we focus on the determinants of demand for sporting events
(chapter 7). We make use of the NHL Lockout in 2012/13 that led many NHL-players
to affiliate with teams overseas, e.g. in Germany and Czech. We consider NHL-players
to be international hockey stars and hence analyze whether the presence of stars affect
the demand for hockey matches in the German hockey league ’DEL’ and the Czech
counterpart ’Extraliga’. While we find only negligible effects of stars on attendance for
matches of the DEL, results indicate that superstars attract considerably more spectators
in the Extraliga, especially if stars play for the away team.
The focus of the work at hand lies on tournament theory. I present different studies
that analyze certain theoretical implications. Although empirical results provide some
new insights into tournament theory, there are still open questions with respect to the
effect of contests on participants’ behavior. For instance, theoretical literature on the
relationship between effort and risk assumes that high risks typically lead to low effort.
To the best of my knowledge, this assumption has never been tested empirically so far.
Furthermore it would be interesting to investigate whether effort, sabotage and risk-
taking interact with each other. Until now research only focuses on one of these factors.
In contrast to previous years, the modern world is addicted to data. Everywhere data
on individual behavior are collected, be it in sports, social media, consumer behavior,
organizations, traffic or other fields of interest. Hence, more and more data become
available so that more detailed empirical analysis may be possible for future studies on
tournaments and further economic research questions. So far, many of the empirical
pieces of evidence rely on sports data as data on performance in other industries are
hardly available. Szymanski (2003) points out that sports are not to be equated with
natural experiments within the scope of empirical research on moral hazard or adverse
selection since the theoretical assumption that monitoring agents is costly or not possible
is not true for sporting contests. With improving data availability it may be possible to
find even better settings for this kind of investigations in future. Nevertheless, sports
data provide a well-suited setting for economic research and helps to better understand
individual’s behavior and economic relationships.
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